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ABSTRACT

This Article highlights an important shift occurring in the analytical framework used to assess the
constitutional validity of abortion related laws. Specifically, the Article analyzes the adoption by
lower courts of a significant modification to the undue burden analysis developed by Justice
O’Connor in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. As described by
Justice O’Connor, the undue burden analysis focuses on the purpose or legislative basis of an
abortion related law, and the effect of the law. If the law is reasonably related to a legitimate state
interest, it should be upheld unless the effect of the law presents a substantial obstacle to a woman’s
liberty interest in being able to legally decide to have an abortion before viability. Lower courts
have recently introduced a balancing inquiry into the Casey analysis, at least as to an abortion
related law enacted to serve state interests in health and safety, e.g., laws designed to prevent the
potential for substandard care in the context of abortion. The balancing affects both steps of the
Casey analysis. In assessing the legislative basis for the law, courts are requiring empirical proof
that the law furthers state interests, and also are assessing the extent to which the interests are
likely to be advanced. In assessing the effect of the law, a finding that the state has not produced
sufficient empirical evidence showing a strong relationship between the law and state interests
triggers a diminution of the concept of substantial obstacle. Courts adopting this balancing
approach have advanced a number of theories in support of its use, which largely draw on aspects
of Casey and Gonzales v. Carhart. This Article assesses the merits of the theories and concludes
that, although a refinement to the traditional understanding of the Casey analysis is appropriate,
the balancing approach has no support in Supreme Court precedent and represents a move back
toward aspects of abortion jurisprudence rejected by a clear majority of the Court in Casey.
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INTRODUCTION
1

Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey represents
an important point in the American experience with legalized abor2
tion. A majority of the Court, seven Justices, agreed that Roe v. Wade
and its progeny had failed to strike the appropriate balance between
a woman’s interest in terminating a pregnancy and legitimate state
interests arising from the fact that abortion is an act “fraught with
3
consequences for others.” Roe and its companion case, Doe v. Bolton,
had opened the door to abortion on demand and substantially closed
the door to state legislative efforts relating to abortion, whether to
encourage continuation of a pregnancy and preservation of the life
of the unborn, to help ensure safe abortion procedures or responsible abortion providers, to ensure the integrity of the medical profession, or to prompt public dialogue that may contribute to better understanding of abortion procedures or medical advances related to
4
abortion. The Justices in Casey sought to modify abortion jurispru1
2
3

4

505 U.S. 833 (1992).
410 U.S. 113 (1973) (invalidating Texas statutes criminalizing abortion).
Casey, 505 U.S. at 852. Three Justices joined the plurality opinion adopting what has become known as the undue burden analysis, id. at 869–79 (O’Connor, J., joined by Kennedy & Souter, JJ.); and four Justices joined an opinion concurring in the judgment and
dissenting in part. Id. at 944–79 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by White, Scalia, and Thomas,
JJ.) (explaining that Roe should be overruled, and that state regulation of abortion should
be reviewed using the same approach used to assess laws arguably infringing on a protected liberty interest).
The majority in Roe characterized a woman’s right to decide to abort a pregnancy as
“fundamental” and required that state interests be “compelling” to justify regulation. 410
U.S. at 155. The majority also adopted a very narrow view of when those state interests
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dence in a way that would better accommodate laws furthering legitimate state interests, but did not agree on the proper way to accomplish that objective. Although seven Justices backed away from viewing the right recognized in Roe as fundamental, characterizing it
instead as “some freedom to terminate a pregnancy,” only three Justices joined Part IV of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s opinion, which
set out a new analysis for assessing the permissibility of state laws re5
lating to abortion.

would be sufficiently compelling to justify restrictions on abortion. An interest in preservation and protection of maternal health was deemed sufficiently compelling only after
the first trimester, and an interest in human life was deemed sufficiently compelling only
at viability. Id. at 162–63. In Bolton, the Court further impeded the ability of state legislatures to foster interests in the health of the mother, the life of the unborn, or medical
standards. 410 U.S 179 (1973). The state law at issue in Bolton restricted abortion except
when the physician, “based upon his best clinical judgment,” decided the procedure is
“necessary.” Id. at 183. Justice Harry Blackmun’s opinion rejected the challengers’ claim
that the provision was unconstitutionally vague, finding that it allowed the physician ample freedom to exercise professional or clinical judgment, i.e., the provision would allow
the physician freedom to take into account whatever factors the physician deemed appropriate in the exercise of “medical judgment, properly and professionally exercised.”
Id. at 191. Justice Blackmun expressly noted:
The medical judgment may be exercised in the light of all factors—physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman’s age—relevant to the well-being of the
patient. All these factors may relate to health. This allows the attending physician
the room he needs to make his best medical judgment. And it is room that operates
for the benefit, and not the disadvantage, of the pregnant woman.

5

Id. at 192. Because the decision upheld the challenged abortion law, its negative impact
on a state’s ability to restrict abortion was not immediately apparent. However, as a consequence of this aspect of Bolton, an exception from abortion restrictions for the health of
the mother—which the Court in Roe required even after viability—has become a vehicle
for abortion on demand. The decisions rendered unenforceable all of the existing abortion laws across all fifty states. In the period prior to Roe, the process of state-by-state
modification of state abortion laws had been spurred by recent promulgation of model
abortion laws. However, the legislation struck down in Roe was representative of abortion
laws that had been in existence for a number of decades, and the legislation struck down
in Bolton was representative of the newer wave of abortion regulation. Together, Roe and
Bolton required all states to start over—and to enact legislation consistent with Roe’s trimester/viability framework and Doe’s broad view of the scope of freedom that a woman
and her physician must decide whether an abortion is health-related. For a comprehensive explanation of the Roe decision, the decision-making process leading to the decision,
and its consequences, see CLARKE D. FORSYTHE, ABUSE OF DISCRETION (2013).
See supra note 3. Justice O’Connor penned the primary opinion. See Casey, 505 U.S. at
843–902. Part I of the Court’s opinion is a summary of Justice O’Connor’s opinion, explaining that the “essential holding of Roe v. Wade should be retained and once again reaffirmed” and pronouncing Justice O’Connor’s view of the three-part essential holding of
Roe. Id. at 846. Part II of the Court’s opinion purports to explain why a woman’s “decision to terminate her pregnancy” is a protected liberty interest. Id. Part III of the Court’s
opinion explains why adhering to the concept of stare decisis is appropriate. Id. at 854.
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Under the Casey analysis, generally called the undue burden analysis, laws regulating abortion are permissible if they further legitimate
state interests and do not impose a substantial obstacle in the path of
6
a woman seeking an abortion. As predicted by Justice Antonin Scal7
ia, the undue burden analysis has proven to be difficult to apply.
Lower courts are adopting differing approaches as to a number of issues, leading to variable and difficult to reconcile results. One key
issue the cases have highlighted is the extent to which the analysis—at
least as to an abortion-related law enacted to serve state interests in
health and safety—includes a weighing of the extent to which the law
advances the state interest and, if not sufficiently substantial, a diminution of the substantial obstacle standard. The approach significantly changes the analysis. Rather than a standard threshold, the
concept of substantial obstacle becomes a moving target or, if the
view of Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
is correct—that “[t]he feebler the medical grounds, the likelier the
8
burden, even if slight, to be ‘undue’ . . . .” —a meaningless standard.
Judge Posner’s endorsement of this new approach, referred to
herein as the “Balancing Approach,” represents a definite and signifi9
cant shift in abortion jurisprudence. Further, despite the significant
modification to the traditional understanding of the Casey analysis (or
perhaps because of it), lower courts seem eager to embrace the Balancing Approach. Their embrace is reflected in several recent judicial opinions addressing the constitutionality of state laws having
10
practical effects on the ability to easily obtain an abortion. This Ar-

6
7
8
9

10

Justice O’Connor explains that it is the combined considerations of the correctness of
Roe’s decision to characterize the right as a protected liberty interest and the force of stare
decisis in this particular context which outweigh arguments to overrule Roe. Id. at 860,
869. Part IV is a plurality opinion, and it is in Part IV that Justice O’Connor adheres to
some aspects of the decision in Roe and jettisons others, and articulates a new approach to
analyzing state restrictions on abortion. Id. at 869–79. Part V involves application of Justice O’Connor’s approach to assessing state regulation of abortion. Id. at 879.
See infra notes 29–32 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 35–38 and accompanying text.
Planned Parenthood of Wis. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 798 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. denied,
134 S. Ct. 2841 (2014).
Circuit court decisions prior to Van Hollen did not apply the approach. See, e.g., Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Comm’r S.C. Dept. of Health & Envtl. Control, 317 F.3d 357, 363
(4th Cir. 2002); Women’s Health Ctr. of W. Cnty., Inc. v. Webster, 871 F.2d 1377, 1381
(8th Cir. 1989).
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Humble, 753 F.3d 905 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding
that the burden on women seeking abortion outweighs the strength of Arizona’s justification for its law); Planned Parenthood Southeast, Inc. v. Strange, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1330
(M.D. Ala. 2014) (deciding, after a ten-day trial, that the challenged state law created a
substantial obstacle for women seeking abortions); Planned Parenthood Southeast, Inc.
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ticle highlights the theories advanced by courts in support of the Balancing Approach, and analyzes them in light of a careful reading of
the most relevant Supreme Court precedent, namely, the Casey deci11
sion and the decision in Gonzales v. Carhart.
Careful scrutiny
demonstrates that the Supreme Court cases do not support the Balancing Approach. Indeed, adopting the Balancing Approach in reality constitutes a move back toward aspects of abortion jurisprudence
abandoned by seven Justices in Casey. Further, in adopting the Balancing Approach, lower courts are side-stepping important issues deserving full analysis before invalidating state laws furthering legitimate state interests.
I. THE CASEY ANALYSIS
The Court in Casey did not overrule Roe v. Wade, in part because of
an expansive view of the nature of a woman’s interest relating to the
12
question whether to terminate a pregnancy, and in part because of
concern that acknowledging an error would erode respect for the
Supreme Court and concern about upsetting people’s reliance on
13
ready access to abortion. However, a majority of the Court agreed
that important state interests exist that would justify greater government regulation of access to abortion, abortion procedures, and
abortion providers and facilities, and a majority agreed that changes
to abortion jurisprudence were necessary and appropriate to better
accommodate government initiatives enacted to serve legitimate state
14
interests. The Court in Casey expressly overruled aspects of some
15
prior Supreme Court decisions and upheld several state law re-

11
12
13
14

15

v. Strange, 9 F. Supp. 3d 1272 (M.D. Ala. 2014) (resolving parties’ motions for summary
judgment, and deciding a trial was warranted on Planned Parenthood’s undue burden
claim); Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673 (W.D. Tex. 2014), aff’d in
part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563 (5th Cir.
2015), order modified, 790 F.3d 598 (5th Cir. 2015); see also Planned Parenthood of the
Heartland, Inc. v. Iowa Bd. of Medicine, 865 N.W.2d 252, 263–64 (2015) (following the
view of the Seventh and Ninth Circuits).
550 U.S. 124 (2007).
See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846–53 (Part II of the opinion).
Id. at 854–69 (Part III of the opinion).
Id. at 869–79 (Part IV of the opinion). Although only three Justices joined Part IV of the
opinion, four other Justices clearly agreed with these propositions, as they would have
overruled Roe, thereby allowing states to enact laws rationally related to legitimate state
interests. See id. at 944–79 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in
part).
See Thornburgh v. Amer. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (discussing cases that “are inconsistent with Roe’s statement that the State has a legitimate interest
in promoting the life or potential life of the unborn”); id. at 875 (noting that the Court

662

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 18:2

strictions on abortion: a law requiring a physician to provide in16
formed consent twenty-four hours before performing an abortion; a
law prohibiting (except in a medical emergency) an abortion performed on an unemancipated eighteen year old without informed
consent of at least one parent or a finding by a court that the woman
17
is mature and capable of giving informed consent; and various rec18
ord keeping and reporting requirements.
In the main opinion, written by Justice O’Connor, the Court adhered to some aspects of the decision in Roe and jettisoned others.
On the one hand, Justice O’Connor purported to adhere to the “essential” holding of Roe, including the proposition that the Constitution of the United States affords a woman some freedom to terminate
19
her pregnancy.
Also, in Part IV (the plurality opinion) Justice
O’Connor retained Roe’s principle that viability is a key point in a
pregnancy; meaning that post-viability a state’s interest in preserving
and respecting human life would support a ban on abortion (as long
20
as an exception exists to protect the health and life of a woman).
On the other hand, the Court departed from other principles set
out in Roe—albeit under the guise of giving effect to a part of Roe that
had been given “too little acknowledgement and implementation by
21
the Court” in cases subsequent to Roe. Justice O’Connor focused in
part on those sentences in the Roe decision that acknowledge the
22
state’s “important and legitimate interest in potential life.” In Roe,
Justice Harry Blackmun explicitly held that the state interest in potential life would not justify any regulation of abortion until the point
23
of viability. Justice O’Connor departed from this diminished view of
the state interest in human life, noting that:
Even in the earliest stages of pregnancy, the State may enact rules and
regulations designed to encourage [a woman] to know that there are
philosophic and social arguments of great weight that can be brought to
bear in favor of continuing the pregnancy to full term and that there are
procedures and institutions to allow [for] adoption of unwanted children

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

has struck down laws that “in no real sense deprived women of the ultimate decision”);
505 U.S. at 882 (overruling aspects of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S.
416 (1983).
505 U.S. at 881–87.
Id. at 899–900.
Id. at 900–01.
Id. at 869.
Id. at 846, 870.
Id. at 871.
Id. at 871 (citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 163).
See 410 U.S. at 163.

Dec. 2015]

CASEY’S UNDUE BURDEN TEST

663

as well as a certain degree of state assistance if the mother chooses to
24
raise the child herself.

Justice O’Connor also departed from Roe’s diminished view of a
state’s important and legitimate interest in health and safety, which
Roe deemed sufficiently compelling only after the first trimester—
erroneously believing that, until that time, “mortality in abortion may
25
be less than mortality in normal childbirth.” Again, seven Justices
agreed with the need to abandon these aspects of Roe.
The heightened view of the importance of legitimate state inter26
ests necessarily required abandonment of Roe’s trimester framework.
Justice O’Connor noted the contradictory nature of the analysis in
Roe: because the trimester framework had forbidden any regulation
designed to further maternal health until the end of the first trimester, and any regulation designed to promote the state interest in
unborn human life before viability, it was incompatible with Roe’s
27
recognition that those interests exist throughout pregnancy. Abandonment of the trimester framework in-turn required re-articulation
of how to assess whether state regulation bearing on pre-viability
abortion is a permissible or impermissible infringement of a woman’s
protected liberty interest. For this purpose, Justice O’Connor created
what has become known as the undue burden analysis. Justice
O’Connor explained:
Numerous forms of state regulation might have the incidental effect of
increasing the cost or decreasing the availability of medical care, whether
for abortion or any other medical procedure. The fact that a law which
serves a valid purpose, one not designed to strike at the right itself, has
the incidental effect of making it more difficult or more expensive to
procure an abortion cannot be enough to invalidate it. Only where the
state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman’s ability to make
this decision does the power of the State reach into the heart of the liber28
ty protected by the Due Process Clause.

24
25

26

27
28

505 U.S. at 872.
See Casey, 505 U.S. at 875–76, 878; Roe, 410 U.S. at 162–63; see also Byron Calhoun, The Maternal Mortality Myth in the Context of Legalized Abortion; Systematic Review, 80 THE LINACRE
QUARTERLY 264 (2013) (detailing a number of factors making abortion-related data and
maternal mortality data unreliable and concluding that flawed techniques have produced
an overestimation of maternal mortality and an underestimation of abortion mortality).
Casey, 505 U.S. at 873 (“The trimester framework suffers from these basic flaws: in its
formulation it misconceives the nature of the pregnant woman’s interest; and in practice
it undervalues the State’s interest in potential life, as recognized in Roe.”).
Id. at 876.
Id. at 874.
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. . . A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that
a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obsta29
cle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.
. . . What is at stake is the woman’s right to make the ultimate decision,
not a right to be insulated from all others in doing so. Regulations which
do no more than create a structural mechanism by which the State, or
the parent or guardian of a minor, may express profound respect for the
life of the unborn are permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to
the woman’s exercise of the right to choose. Unless it has that effect on
her right of choice, a state measure designed to persuade her to choose
childbirth over abortion will be upheld if reasonably related to that goal.
Regulations designed to foster the health of the woman seeking an abor30
tion are valid if they do not constitute an undue burden.

The analysis envisioned by Justice O’Connor thus consists of an inquiry into purpose and effect: a relational inquiry focusing on the
purpose of the law and whether the law is reasonably related to a valid state interest, e.g., the life of the unborn child, or the health and
safety of the mother; and an inquiry focusing on whether the effect of
the law is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seek31
ing a previability abortion. Justice O’Connor also provided some
basic benchmarks: increased cost or practical difficulties indirectly
resulting from laws do not constitute a substantial obstacle; rather, a
finding of substantial obstacle turns on an effect more directly impacting a woman’s interest in legally deciding to abort, i.e., an effect
32
on the decision making process itself.
Although a majority of the Court agreed with these benchmarks,
the undue burden analysis itself did not garner the support of a majority of the Court. Two Justices would have adhered to the strict
33
scrutiny analysis set in play with the decision in Roe. Four other Jus-

29
30
31
32

33

Id. at 877.
Id. at 877–78 (internal citations removed).
See infra Part IV for a discussion of why this way of framing of the Casey analysis is accurate
and should be adopted.
See Casey, 505 U.S. at 874 (emphasizing that an impermissible burden is one that effects “a
woman’s ability to make [the] decision”); see also id. at 875 (noting the past error of striking down laws that “in no real sense deprived women of the ultimate decision”); id. at
887–98 (Part V(C) of the opinion) (invalidating a spousal notification provision because,
at least for women who feared domestic violence, the provision’s effect on a woman’s ability to decide to abort was tantamount to a ban on abortion).
Id. at 934 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Roe’s requirement of
strict scrutiny as implemented through the trimester framework should not be disturbed.
No other approach has gained a majority, and no other is more protective of the woman’s
fundamental right.”); see also id. at 912–22 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 952 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
(opining that “the Casey joint opinion represents the holding of the Court in that case”)
(citing Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (explaining that, when “no single
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tices, however, would have simply overruled Roe and would review
state regulation of abortion using the same approach used to assess
laws arguably infringing on a protected liberty interest, i.e., a form of
34
rational basis review.
This later group of Justices also pointed out problematic aspects
of the undue burden analysis. Justice Scalia noted that it is a standard without pedigree, i.e., it was “created largely out of whole cloth”
as a way to avoid the barriers to reasonable state regulation of abor35
Moreover, precisely because it was
tion without overruling Roe.
“plucked from nowhere,” he predicted that the standard would not
provide a tool for appropriately cabining judicial discretion: “the
question of what is a ‘substantial obstacle’ to abortion will undoubt36
edly engender a variety of conflicting views.” Pointing to the divergent opinions in the Casey decision itself as to the abortion regulations at issue, Chief Justice William Rehnquist similarly noted that the
undue burden standard would fail to restrain judges from relying on
subjective preferences: that is, similar to the Roe decision itself, the
undue burden standard would allow a court—and ultimately the Supreme Court—to impart its own preferences on the states under the
37
guise of the Constitution.
Justice Scalia agreed, noting that the
standard was but a “verbal shell game [concealing] raw judicial policy
38
choices concerning what is ‘appropriate’ abortion legislation.”
Nonetheless, the decision in Casey clearly revealed a majority of
the Justices departing from Roe’s principle that a woman’s freedom to
decide to have an abortion is a fundamental right triggering a strictscrutiny type of analysis. Further, although preserving in some respects the abortion on demand aspect of Roe and Bolton (due to the
health exception requirement), the majority in Casey viewed states as
having legitimate interests justifying regulation of the provision of
abortion services—including regulations applicable during the first
trimester; and the majority supported an analysis designed to better

34

35
36
37
38

rationale” secures the assent of five Justices, “the holding of the Court may be viewed as
that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds”)).
See Casey, 505 U.S. at 944, 951–52, 966 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part) (“A woman’s interest in having an abortion is a form of liberty protected by the Due Process Clause, but States may regulate abortion procedures in
ways rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”)
Id. at 987 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part); see also id. at 964
(Rehnquist, C..J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
Id. at 965 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
See id. at 965–66.
Id. at 987 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
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accommodate state laws reasonably related to legitimate state interests notwithstanding some negative impact on ready access to abortion services.
39
The decision in Gonzales v. Carhart confirmed the Court’s greater
receptivity to legislative efforts to advance legitimate state interests.
In Gonzales, a majority of the Court rejected a facial challenge to a
federal ban on use of the procedure known as partial-birth abortion
40
(or intact dilation and extraction (“intact D & E”)). The Justices
were able to uphold the law using the principles set out in the Casey
plurality opinion, but without specifically endorsing Casey’s undue
burden analysis or its retention of viability as a key factor in assessing
41
the permissibility of legislation regulating abortion. The Court used
the undue burden analysis to frame the decision, but the outcome
hinged on two distinct aspects of the Casey decision: Casey’s confirmation of the need for a health exception, and the recognition that
abortion jurisprudence must accommodate the government’s legiti42
mate interest in preserving and promoting the life of the unborn.
In assessing the effect of the law, the Court focused on the failure to
include a health exception. The issue, thus, was whether the ban sub43
jected women to “significant health risks.” Because the medical evidence was conflicting as to whether the banned procedure was ever
genuinely medically necessary, and because a safe alternative method
remained available, the Court held that the effect of the ban did not
44
present a substantial obstacle.
Although not endorsing the Casey undue burden analysis, the
Gonzales decision nonetheless shed light on how courts should apply
the analysis. Indeed, some lower courts adopting the Balancing Approach have pointed to Gonzales as support. As Part III of this Article
shows, however, the appropriateness of the Balancing Approach turns
on a proper reading of both Casey and Gonzales. First, however, it is
useful to understand the nature of the Balancing Approach and how
it impacts judicial review of the constitutionality of state laws relating
to abortion. Part IV of the Article highlights the Van Hollen decision
in which Judge Posner endorsed the Balancing Approach, cases illus39
40
41
42

43
44

550 U.S. 124, 130 (2007).
Id. at 133, 167–68 (emphasizing that the decision was limited to a facial challenge to the
law).
Id. at 145–46.
Id. at 145, 158 (noting that the premise that the state has a legitimate interest in protecting human life from the inception of pregnancy “cannot be set at naught” by Casey’s requirement of a health exception).
See id. at 161.
See id. at 161–67.
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trating that the approach significantly lowers the bar in the substantial obstacle inquiry, and litigation in the Fifth Circuit in which the
Balancing Approach has been rejected.
II. INTRODUCTION TO THE BALANCING APPROACH
Lower courts applying the Casey analysis have tended to view it as
consisting of two steps. Specifically, courts have described the analysis as requiring, first, an assessment of the basis for the law; and, second, an assessment of whether the law imposes an undue burden—
i.e., whether the purpose or effect of the law places a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion. A study of the
cases that have explored use of the Balancing Approach shows that
the Balancing Approach modifies both steps of the analysis, and does
so in ways that work against the Supreme Court’s efforts to better accommodate legislative efforts to advance legitimate state interests in
the arena of abortion.
1. The Van Hollen Decision
Judge Posner in 2013 endorsed use of the Balancing Approach in
the Casey analysis. In Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin v. Van Hollen,
abortion-providing clinics challenged a statute prohibiting a physician from performing an abortion unless the physician has admitting
privileges at a hospital no more than thirty miles from the clinic in
45
which the abortion is performed. The district court had granted a
preliminary injunction, and Judge Posner emphasized the difficult
balancing involved in making such a decision at the trial court level
46
and the deference given to such a decision on appeal. Judge Posner’s decision, however, reflected deference not merely to the district
court’s findings of fact and discretionary conclusions, but also the
court’s views of the governing law. Further, as highlighted by a concurring opinion, Judge Posner’s decision represented a break from
relevant Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit precedent, and yet
Judge Posner provided no rationale for the break and cited no authority.
The first half of the opinion reads as though it is an assessment of
Planned Parenthood’s likelihood of success on the merits, which
turned on whether the Wisconsin law imposed an undue burden on
45
46

See 738 F.3d 786, 787 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing WIS. STAT. § 940.15(5) (1985)).
Id. at 795 (explaining the balancing involved in deciding whether to grant a preliminary
injunction).
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47

women. Judge Posner began with a conclusion that the law “seems
bound to have a substantial impact on the practical availability of
48
abortion in Wisconsin.” This conclusion was grounded in Judge
Posner’s apparent agreement with a finding made by the district
court: that the abortion doctors used by Planned Parenthood would
have difficulty obtaining admitting privileges. To support this conclusion, Judge Posner pointed to both facts and speculation: the fact
that many of Planned Parenthood’s doctors didn’t have admitting
privileges at hospitals within thirty miles of the clinics and that some
49
of the doctors would have to obtain privileges at multiple hospitals;
and speculation that some hospitals would not grant privileges to
doctors who perform abortions, and that it would be difficult for
abortion doctors to get privileges because relevant factors often include number of admissions, revenue generated, or other economic
50
grounds, which would tend to work against abortion doctors. In
agreeing with the district court, Judge Posner did not address important issues, e.g., whether the law itself directly caused the “obstacle,” as opposed to the other factors, and why this type of obstacle
51
could be sufficient in light of Casey’s benchmarks.
Judge Posner next focused on the need for the law, and thus arguably was assessing the relational inquiry aspect of the undue burden analysis. Here again he simply repeated findings and conclusions made by the district court. In part he disputed the need for the
52
law to be made effective immediately. But he also disputed the need
for the law generally, by focusing on the fact that the state’s concerns

47
48
49
50

51

52

Id. at 791 (explaining the plaintiff’s theory in the appeal of the preliminary injunction).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 791–92. It is appropriate to characterize this as speculation because the district
court noted testimonial evidence of state witnesses that cast doubt on the plaintiffs’ allegations. See Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Van Hollen, No. 13–cv–465–wmc,
2013 WL 3989238, at *4–5; (W.D. Wis., Aug. 2, 2013). The district court did not make
any specific findings of fact about the ultimate ability of plaintiffs’ doctors to obtain admitting privileges. See id. at *16–17.
Indeed, at this point in the opinion Judge Richard Posner did not discuss the legal standard used to decide whether an impact rises to the level of an undue burden. See Van
Hollen, 738 F.3d at 791–93. In contrast, Judge Daniel Manion began analysis of the undue
burden prong of the Casey analysis by noting: “We cannot find the requirement unconstitutional unless the plaintiffs can show that the requirement ‘will have the likely effect of
preventing a significant number of women for whom the regulation is relevant from obtaining abortions.’” Id. at 804 (Manion, J., concurring) (citing Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d
446, 481 (7th Cir. 1999)).
Id. at 793. The Wisconsin legislature had enacted the law in mid-June, the governor
signed the law on July 5th, a Friday, and it was effective the following Monday. Id. at 788;
see also id. at 803 (Manion, J., concurring).
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about continuity of care and qualifications of providers are not limited to the abortion context, and he suggested that the state had not
presented evidence showing a link between having admitting privileges and women receiving better care or suffering from fewer com53
plications.
In the first half of the opinion, then, Judge Posner concluded that
Planned Parenthood was likely to succeed on the merits because it
could prove that the law imposed a substantial obstacle and the state
could not prove that the law furthered state interests. Judge Posner
did not, in this part of the opinion, discuss the legal standards used to
assess whether a burden rises to the level of substantial obstacle. Rather, he simply agreed with the district court’s conclusions that the
law did impose a substantial obstacle. The district court’s conclusions, however, depended on the Balancing Approach. The district
court focused on the increased distances some women would have to
54
travel if some of Planned Parenthood’s clinics closed. Given Casey’s
benchmarks, the court could not convincingly conclude that the
burden presented a substantial obstacle without changing the standard—which the court did.
[T]he court considers these obstacles in access to abortion services [an]
undue burden in light of the dubious benefits to women’s health [from]
the admitting privileges restriction . . . . Even if there were some evidence
that the admitting privileges requirement would actually further women’s
health, any benefit is greatly outweighed by the burdens caused by increased travel, decreased access and, at least for some women, the denial
55
of an in-state option for abortion services.

Judge Posner’s agreement with the district court’s conclusions in this
part of the opinion reflects an implicit endorsement of the trial

53

54

55

Id. at 793, 795. Here Judge Posner may well have been relying on findings of fact made
by the district court. The district court said the state had “failed to establish any credible
link between admitting privileges at a nearby hospital and furthering continuity of care.”
See Van Hollen, 2013 WL 3989238, at *9. However, the state had presented evidence and
the trial court also found it was “uncertain at best” whether the law would promote continuity of care for at least some women who suffered complications following an abortion.
Id. The district court also had recognized that the law might promote accountability by
way of peer review in cases involving mismanaged health care of patient abandonment.
Id. at *10.
See id. at at *16–17. Although the increased distance for these women would be 100
miles, the trial court and Judge Posner focused on the total miles the women would experience: 400 miles (100 miles each way, for two trips since Wisconsin also requires clinics
to provide counseling and an ultrasound at least twenty-four hours before performing an
abortion). See Van Hollen, 738 F.3d at 796. Notably, the Court in Casey suggested that
costs associated with doubling a six-hour round trip would not be an undue burden. See
Casey, 505 U.S. at 886–87.
Van Hollen, 2013 WL 3989238, at *19.
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court’s view of the law; an endorsement which was made explicit toward the end of the opinion.
But the opinion is written in such a way that the weighing of interests by Judge Posner occurs as part of the analysis of harms that is
required in deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction—a
tactic that masks to some extent his endorsement of adding a step to
the Casey analysis. That is, in some ways, there is nothing obviously
novel about his analysis until the end when he abruptly shifts back to
the Casey analysis and states: “The cases that deal with abortionrelated statutes sought to be justified on medical grounds require not
only evidence (here lacking as we have seen) that the medical
grounds are legitimate but also that the statute not impose an ‘undue
56
burden’ on women seeking abortions.” After noting that abortion
statutes justified on medical grounds may not impose an undue burden, he continued:
The feebler the medical grounds, the likelier the burden, even if slight,
to be “undue” in the sense of disproportionate or gratuitous. It is not a
matter of the number of women likely to be affected. . . . In this case the
medical grounds thus far presented . . . are feeble, yet the burden great
because of the state’s refusal to have permitted abortion providers a rea57
sonable time within which to comply.

In these few sentences Judge Posner has radically modified the Casey
analysis. He injected into the analysis an evidentiary assessment of
the extent to which an abortion law promotes admittedly legitimate
state interests in women’s health and, in essence, has lowered the
standard used in analyzing whether a law presents a “substantial ob58
stacle” in the path of a woman seeking an abortion.
In addition to endorsing the Balancing Approach, Judge Posner’s
assessment of the state’s justification for the admitting privileges law
was nothing short of hostile. The state had argued that the law protects the health of women by helping to ensure continuity of care for
women who suffer complications following an abortion and by operating as a sort of “Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval,” and had
56
57
58

See Van Hollen, 738 F.3d at 798.
Id.
See id. The reference to the relevancy of the “number of women likely to be affected” reflects Judge Posner’s rejection of the heightened standard used in facial challenges to
abortion laws. See id. at 804–05 (Manion, J., concurring in part) (explaining that, in this
facial challenge to the law, “[w]e cannot find the requirement unconstitutional unless the
plaintiffs can show that the requirement ‘will have the likely effect of preventing a significant number of women for whom the regulation is relevant from obtaining abortions’”;
and later noting that “more than 70% of women in Wisconsin who seek abortions live in
the southern counties near Milwaukee and Madison, where clinics will continue operating” and that “most Wisconsin women seeking abortions can travel to clinics in Illinois”).

Dec. 2015]

CASEY’S UNDUE BURDEN TEST

671

submitted an affidavit from a qualified physician about a case in
59
which admitting privileges likely would have made a difference. The
trial court had explicitly affirmed that credentialing, continuity of
care, and peer review of abortion procedures “all may further women’s health,” noting that “each component may better equip physi60
cians to handle complications.” Further, the concurring opinion
pointed out that the admitting privileges law had been enacted within
weeks of national media attention to the “Gosnell scandal” and that
the state had submitted evidence of “numerous other examples of
egregious and substandard care by abortion doctors and clinics” (as
61
reflected in the Appendix to the Concurrence).
Judge Posner’s response was dismissive and the opinion is filled
with criticism directed at the state. He was critical about the legislative process: the limited legislative deliberations leading to the law;
that the legislature was concerned about the quality of care for abortion but allegedly not about other invasive procedures performed
outside of the hospital; and certain shortcomings in the law (e.g., did
not require abortion doctors to care for patients with complications,
62
and did not distinguish between surgical and medication abortions).
He similarly criticized the state’s efforts at trial. He dismissed arguments about quality of care, pointing to statistics showing very low
63
rates of complications requiring hospitalization following abortion,
59
60

61

62
63

Id. at 789, 797.
See Van Hollen, 2013 WL 3989238, at *14–15 (arguing that the state had not “connect[ed]
the dots between these components of quality patient care and the admitting privileges
requirement” primarily because the state had not produced evidence of a specific case in
which a doctor’s lack of privileges had been a factor in an abortion patient’s negative
outcome following complications; the state thereafter provided an affidavit which Judge
Posner discounted).
Van Hollen, 738 F.3d at 802–03, 807–10 (Manion, J., concurring in part) (discussing Gosnell scandal); see also id. at 800–04 (highlighting many facts that support the state’s position: a statement related to patient safety issued by the American College of Surgeons
which includes as one alternative for regulating “office-based surgery” a requirement that
physicians performing the surgery to have admitting privileges “at a nearby hospital”; the
fact that the plaintiff had offered no evidence that doctors performing other types of “office-based surgery” do not have privileges; the parties’ agreement that some abortions result in complications requiring hospitalization; the fact that hospital credentialing decisions are well-recognized as one means of fostering quality care and thus that “every
circuit to address the issue has held that admitting privileges requirements further states’
legitimate interests”; and the fact that many abortion patients are young and vulnerable
and thus arguably in greater need of state attention to quality of care provided in “officebased” clinics). Judge Manion’s appendix is included as an appendix to this article. See
infra Appendix.
Id. at 789, 798.
See id. at 797 (pointing to studies showing a 0.05% complication rate for aspiration abortions, and a 0.06% rate for medical abortions).
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and was dismissive of the state’s concerns about underreporting of
64
complications without more evidence. Regarding affidavit evidence
suggesting that a failure to have admitting privileges resulted in poor
outcomes, he stated: “one (doubtful) case in 29 years is not impres65
sive evidence of the medical benefits of the Wisconsin statute.” As
recognized by other courts, Judge Posner was looking for empirical
66
proof of the efficacy of the law. As noted, this assessment occurred
as part of the “balancing of the harms” issue central to a decision
about a preliminary injunction and, in that context, evidence bearing
on the extent to which a law promotes a legitimate state interest arguably is not out of place. But Judge Posner expressly transplanted
that assessment into the Casey analysis.
The concurring opinion highlighted that the analysis was a break
67
from both Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit precedent, yet, remarkably, Judge Posner provided no analysis or explanation and cit68
ed to no authority for the modification. Despite the undisciplined
nature of Judge Posner’s opinion in Van Hollen, other courts have followed suit. To their credit, these opinions have tried to do what
Judge Posner did not: articulate a line of reasoning that would sup69
port this shift in the Casey analysis. Before assessing those theories,
it is helpful to understand the impact of the Balancing Approach and
the main arguments against the Balancing Approach.
2. Impact of the Balancing Approach
The Balancing Approach endorsed in Van Hollen affects both steps
of the Casey analysis. As to the relational inquiry, Judge Posner dismissed the state’s argument that the admitting privileges law advanced state interests because the state did not make its case with

64
65
66

67

68

69

Id. at 790, 797; see also Van Hollen, 2013 WL 3989238, at *7 (faulting the state’s witnesses
for not citing studies to back statistics about underreporting).
Van Hollen, 738 F.3d at 797.
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott (Abbott II),
748 F.3d 583, 596 (5th Cir. 2014) (disagreeing with the Seventh Circuit’s concerns of a
lack of statistical evidence).
See Van Hollen, 738 F.3d at 799 (Manion, J., concurring in part) (citing Gonzales, 550 U.S.
124, 158 (2007); see also Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v.
Abbott (Abbott I), 734 F.3d 406, 411 (5th Cir. 2013)) (noting that “legislation regulating
abortions must pass muster under rational basis review—and must not have the ‘practical
effect of imposing an undue burden’”); Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446, 481 (7th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 798. After noting that the Casey analysis involves two distinct steps, Judge Posner
cites to important Supreme Court cases, including Casey and Stenberg. Id. However, there
is no attempt to tie his modification of the undue burden analysis to the cases.
See infra Part III.
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empirical proof. Further, he assessed not merely whether the law furthered state interests, but also the extent to which the state interests
were advanced. Concluding that the justification for the law was
“feeble,” Judge Posner then modified the substantial obstacle inquiry,
such that a burden—even if slight—could be found undue. Although the effect of the admitting privileges law at issue seemed analogous to the indirect obstacles deemed insufficient in Casey—
increased costs and/or practical difficulties—use of the Balancing
Approach changes the calculus. Litigation in the Fifth and Ninth
Circuits similarly illustrates that the Balancing Approach significantly
changes the Casey analysis.
In Planned Parenthood of Greater Texas Surgical Health Services v. Ab70
bott (Abbott I), the Fifth Circuit considered a facial challenge by
Planned Parenthood to an admitting privileges law similar to the law
71
at issue in Van Hollen. The district court had struck down the Texas
admitting privileges law, finding that the law lacked a rational basis
72
and presented a substantial obstacle. In describing the Casey analysis, the district court used language resembling the balancing approach used in Van Hollen, noting that courts must first “subject regulations to a rational-basis review to determine whether the law’s
purpose or effect is rationally related to the state’s legitimate interest
balanced with the woman’s interest;” and, if so, according to the court,
the second prong of the analysis involves assessing the purpose and
effect of the law, to determine whether it places a substantial obstacle
73
before a woman seeking an abortion.
Using the standard approach to the Casey analysis, the Fifth Circuit in Abbott I disagreed and stayed the district court’s injunction
74
pending appeal. Review of the district court’s conclusion that the
law lacked a rational basis revealed that the district court had applied
a heightened rational basis standard. The Fifth Circuit pointed to evidence that the state had presented showing that the admitting privi70
71

72
73
74

Abbott I, 734 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2013), motion to vacate stay denied, 134 S. Ct. 506 (2013).
The Texas law required a physician performing or inducing an abortion to have admitting privileges on the date of the abortion at a hospital no more than thirty miles from
the location where the abortion is provided. See Planned Parenthood of Greater Texas
Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 951 F. Supp. 2d 891, 897–98 (W.D. Tex. 2013) (quoting
section 2 of House Bill 2, to be codified at TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
171.0031(a)(1)); see id. at 904 (quoting section 3 of House Bill 2, to be codified at TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 171.063). Plaintiffs also challenged a law directing that medication abortions comply with the FDA approved protocol (and thus precluding the popular off-label protocol). Id. at 904–06.
See id. at 902.
See id. at 898–99 (emphasis added).
See Abbott I, 734 F.3d at 409.
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leges law fostered a woman’s ability to seek consultation and treatment for complications directly from the physician who performed
the abortion (as opposed to an emergency room provider), and thus
would help prevent patient abandonment; and evidence showing that
the law would help ensure that abortion providers were qualified to
75
provide high quality care, and thus would help ensure patient safety.
The district court had ignored this evidence or found it insufficient
76
to show a rational basis for the law. The Fifth Circuit emphasized
the low level of judicial review appropriate in rational basis review,
noting that a legislative choice “is not subject to courtroom
factfinding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by
77
evidence or empirical data.”
The court also found the district
court’s approach to be inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s recognition, in a case upholding a law restricting the performance of abortion to licensed physicians, that “the Constitution gives the States
broad latitude to decide that particular functions may be performed
only by licensed professionals, even if an objective assessment might sug78
gest that those same tasks could be performed by others.”
In reviewing the district court’s decision that the admitting privileges law presented a substantial obstacle, the Fifth Circuit began with
the benchmark established in Casey, namely, that a law that serves a
valid purpose is not rendered unconstitutional by an incidental effect
79
of making it more difficult or expensive to obtain an abortion; and
the court’s analysis focused solely on the effect of the law. The court
again focused on evidence the district court had ignored. The district court had focused only on evidence of clinic closings that would
80
impact twenty-four counties in the Rio Grande Valley. The Fifth
Circuit focused on evidence that more than 90% of women seeking
an abortion in Texas would be able to obtain one from a physician
81
within 100 miles of their residence. Under Casey’s benchmarks this

75
76

77
78
79
80
81

Id. at 411–12.
See id. at 411 (explaining that the district court focused on other evidence involving
emergency room treatment provided to women experiencing complications, i.e., the district court focused on the fact that women going to ERs generally receive good medical
care, but ignored the state’s concern that abortion providers be available to consult their
patients who suffer complications and the state’s attempt to prevent patient abandonment).
Id. (quoting FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993)).
Id. at 412 (quoting Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 973 (1997)).
Id. at 413 (quoting Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 157–58 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 874)).
Id. at 414.
Id. at 414–15. In exploring whether the law presented a substantial burden in a “large
fraction” of the cases, the Fifth Circuit explained that, because the law applies to any phy-
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effect is not a substantial obstacle. The Fifth Circuit also noted that
much of the evidence Planned Parenthood had relied on to show
that it would not be able to staff its facilities with physicians with admitting privileges was unrelated to the Texas admitting privileges
82
law—and thus not relevant to Casey’s undue burden analysis. Without the Balancing Approach, which lowers the substantial obstacle
threshold, the admitting privileges law readily survived the Casey analysis.
83
Planned Parenthood Arizona, Inc. v. Humble, illustrates even more
dramatically the impact of the Balancing Approach. The case involved a facial challenge to an Arizona law requiring medicationinduced abortions to be administered in compliance with protocol
84
outlined in the FDA approved label for the medication. The law was
aimed at use of RU-486, or mifepristone. When the FDA approved
mifepristone for use in inducing abortions, the approved drug label
described a particular regimen (the on-label regimen). Yet, as is of85
ten the case, off-label use of the drug quickly emerged. Legislative

82
83
84
85

sician who performs abortions in Texas, the law affects every woman in Texas seeking an
abortion. Id. at 414.
Id. at 415 (citing the old age of physicians performing abortions and other reasons why
recruiting efforts were unsuccessful).
753 F.3d 905 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 870 (2014).
Id. at 907, 909 (citing H.B. 2036, codified at Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 36-449.03(E)(6), and the
implementing regulation, Ariz. Admin. Code § R9-10-1508(G)).
See id. at 909 (explaining that once approved for marketing, the FDA does not prohibit or
discourage off-label uses of drugs and further, because adding uses to an approved label
requires action by a drug manufacturer, valid uses supported by evidence sometimes never make it onto the label). This is what happened in the case of mifepristone: an offlabel regimen was developed and it has never been added to the drug’s label. Both regimens involve two medications: mifepristone, which kills the embryo/fetus, and
misoprosol, which causes the uterine to contract and expel the embryo/fetus. Planned
Parenthood Arizona, Inc. v. Humble, 13 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1020 (D. Ariz. 2014). The onlabel regimen involves taking 600 milligrams of mifepristone orally at a health facility, returning two days later to take 400 micrograms of misoprosol orally, and returning for a
follow-up visit. Clinical evidence submitted to the FDA to obtain approval for marketing
showed this on-label regimen to be safe and effective for inducing abortion through seven weeks of pregnancy, or forty-nine days from the woman’s last menstrual period
(“LMP”). Humble, 753 F.3d. at 907. The off-label regimen involves taking 200 milligrams
of mifepristone orally at a clinic, taking 800 micrograms of misoprostol two days later at
home, and returning to the clinic for a follow-up visit. Id. at 907–08. Studies (of some
sort) have shown the off-label regimen to be safe and effective through nine weeks of
pregnancy, or sixty-three days LMP. Id. at 907. The off-label regime involves a lower dosage of mifepristone, but doubles the dosage of misoprosal—the drug causing the contractions and expulsions. The more intense and prolonged contractions resulting from the
increased dosage of misoprosal is the reason the off-label regimen is effective through sixty-three days LMP. The more effective expulsion also is the reason its proponents can say
that the off-label regimen has reduced risk factors: namely, the incidence of on-going
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findings accompanying the law explained its purpose as protecting
women from “dangerous and potentially deadly off-label use of abortion-inducing drugs, such as, for example, mifepristone,” and as ensuring that physicians abide by protocol tested and approved by the
86
FDA “as outlined in the drug labels.”
Using the standard approach to the Casey analysis, the district
court in Humble had denied a preliminary injunction, finding that the
law passed rational basis scrutiny and did not impose an undue burden on the right to decide to terminate a pregnancy. The district
court acknowledged that the challengers presented evidence suggesting that medication abortions generally are as safe or safer than surgical abortions; that many practicing physicians consider the off-label
regimen to reflect best practices; that the risk of ongoing pregnancies
and the need for surgical intervention are reduced due to a higher
dosage of a drug causing contractions; and that the off-label regimen
may be used through sixty-three days from the last menstrual period
87
(“LMP”), rather than through day forty-seven LPM. Yet, following a
traditional approach to rational basis review, the court explained that
this evidence did not mean there was no rational basis for the law:
“The State need not legislate the best means by which to achieve a
goal. There is no least restrictive means component to rational basis
review; rational speculation will suffice. An imperfect fit can be rational, and it is not for the [c]ourt to ‘improve’ or ‘cleanse’ the legis88
lative process.” The legislature had sought to protect women from
dangerous off-label uses and the court specifically pointed to Legislative Finding #13, which reflected concern about increased risk of
complications due to failure to complete the two-step medication
89
dosage. Requiring the on-label regimen (which involves taking the
second step at the health facility) is one way to address this concern.
The court stated: “Where reasonable minds can disagree, there is a
90
rational basis.”
Regarding the burdens caused by the law, the court acknowledged
that requiring the on-label regimen would increase the cost of obtaining a medication abortion (costs stemming from the higher dosage of

86
87
88
89
90

pregnancies is reduced from 1% to 0.5%, and the need for surgical intervention to fully
clear the uterus is reduced from 8% to less than 2%. Id. at 908.
Id. at 910; Humble, 13 F. Supp. 3d at 1020.
Humble, 13 F. Supp. 3d, at 1022–23; see supra note 85 for a description of the two regimens.
Id. at 1023 (citing Abbott II, 748 F.3d at 593–94).
Id. at 1022.
Id. at 1023 (citing Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 315).
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mifepristone and from an additional clinic visit), but noted that such
burdens generally have been found to fall short of creating a substan91
tial obstacle. The court concluded that, “[i]n a large fraction of
[the] cases, the law [simply operated to] change the method” availa92
ble. For women seeking medication abortion through day fortynine LMP, the law precluded access to the off-label regimen, but left
93
open the on-label regimen and the option of a surgical abortion. As
to women denied access to medication abortion between days fortynine and sixty-three LMP, the option of surgical abortion remained.
In light of Casey and Gonzales, the ready availability of a safe alterna94
tive method of abortion undermined the challengers’ argument. As
to the argument that the law imposed a substantial obstacle for women seeking abortions between days forty-nine and sixty-three LMP
who for some medical reason could not safely have a surgical abortion, the court explained that the challengers did not produce sufficient evidence or explanation to meet its burden on the issue of substantial obstacle, but also noted that a proper approach to the claim
95
would be an “as-applied challenge” to the law. The district court
opinion thus closely paralleled the majority opinion in Gonzales.
The Ninth Circuit reversed, faulting the district court for not following a refinement to the Casey analysis purportedly established in
an earlier Ninth Circuit case—a refinement involving the Balancing
96
Approach. The Ninth Circuit explained that, given the refinement,
[W]e compare the extent of the burden a law imposes on a woman’s
right to abortion with the strength of the state’s justification for the law.
The more substantial the burden, the stronger the state’s justification for
the law must be to satisfy the undue burden test; conversely, the stronger
the state’s justification, the greater the burden may be before it becomes
“undue.” . . . In [hard cases], we must weigh the burdens against the
state’s justification, asking whether and to what extent the challenged
regulation actually advances the state’s interests. If a burden significantly
97
exceeds what is necessary to advance the state’s interests, it is “undue.”

91
92
93
94
95
96
97

Id. at 1025 (citing and following Planned Parenthood Southwest Ohio Region v. DeWine,
696 F.3d 490, 514 (6th Cir. 2012) (upholding a similar state law)).
Id.
Id. at 1020.
Id. at 1026.
Id.
Humble, 753 F.3d at 914.
Id. at 912–13 (citing Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 542 (9th Cir. 2004)
and WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 2492 (1993) (noting that “undue” is defined as “excessive” or “unwarranted”)).
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Use of the Balancing Approach altered the analysis substantially. The
Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, and ordered the court to is98
sue the preliminary injunction requested by Planned Parenthood.
Although the Ninth Circuit assumed the law would pass rational
basis review, the court nonetheless discounted Arizona’s legislative
findings, which the district court had said plainly reflected a legitimate purpose. The district court had required no trial evidence
where the legislative purpose is plain and the law passes rational basis
review, but the Ninth Circuit held that without evidence in the record
demonstrating that the law advances women’s health the law appears
99
“wholly ‘unnecessary as a matter of [women’s] health.’” This finding clearly impacted the burden analysis. The Ninth Circuit found
that the law created a substantial obstacle because it would increase
costs, which evidence suggested would prevent some poor women
from obtaining abortions; would perhaps lead to one Planned
Parenthood clinic closing, which would lead to greater travel burdens
for some women, which in-turn might delay some abortions; and
would effectively ban medication abortions for some women, e.g.,
100
those who do not discover a pregnancy within forty-nine days LMP.
Whereas the district court had found that, in light of Casey and Gonzales, these burdens were not substantial—especially in light of the
ready availability of a safe alternative method, e.g., surgical abortion,
use of the Balancing Approach changed the calculus such that burdens clearly less substantial sufficed. The Ninth Circuit distinguished
Gonzales and, despite the ready availability of a safe alternative means
to abort, the Ninth Circuit held that the burden created a substantial
101
obstacle.
98

99

100

101

Id. at 917–18 (concluding that the challengers had shown a likelihood of success on their
claim that the law imposes an undue burden, and noting that Arizona had not argued
that plaintiffs failed to show “a likelihood of irreparable harm or that the balance of
hardships and public interest do not favor a preliminary injunction,” and thus had waived
such an argument).
Id. at 914–15 (assuming, without deciding, that the law passed rational basis review, and
quoting Eden, 379 F.3d at 542 (alteration in original)). The Ninth Circuit also highlighted a district court statement that the off-label regime has a “clear advantage” in that it allows medication abortion through the ninth week of pregnancy, rather than the seventh
week, an “advantage” from the perspective of allowing women to choose medication
abortion over surgical abortion for a longer period of time. Id.
Id. at 915–16. The court explained that Eden recognized numerous types of burdens:
“significant increase in the cost”; impact on supply of providers and clinics; delay caused
by the law and the idea that “delay increases health risks”; “a law’s stigmatizing of abortion practice”; legislative “usurping of providers’ ability to exercise medical judgment”;
and the way that the law “interacts with women’s lived experience, socioeconomic factors,
and other abortion regulations.” Id. at 915.
Id. at 917. The court explained:
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The Balancing Approach thus significantly modifies the Casey
analysis. In these cases, the challenges would have been unsuccessful
“but for” a weighing of the extent to which the challenged laws furthered state interests and a diminution of the concept of substantial
obstacle. Without the Balancing Approach, the courts could not have
legitimately concluded that the effect of the laws on access to abortion rose to the level of an undue burden.
3. The Fifth Circuit’s Rejection of the Balancing Approach
The Fifth Circuit in decisions after Abbott I has continued to explicitly reject use of the Balancing Approach. In Abbott II, the Fifth
Circuit’s review of the case on the merits, the court more clearly re102
jected use of the Balancing Approach.
Planned Parenthood had
expressly urged the court to adopt a “stricter standard” because the
state interest in play was that of protecting the mother’s health rather
103
than fetal life. The court did not do so, noting that Supreme Court
104
The court also
precedent does not support such a “bifurcation.”
emphasized the illogical nature of the proposal. By way of example,
the court explained that it makes no sense to try to treat laws protecting the life of the unborn child differently from laws making abortion
safer—because both types of laws serve to protect children: “every
limit on abortion that furthers a mother’s health also protects any existing children and her future ability to bear children even if it facili105
tates a particular abortion.”
To the Fifth Circuit, then, the appropriate analysis, even as to an abortion regulation aimed primarily at

102
103
104
105

[I]n Gonzales, the challenged law left in place “a commonly used and generally
accepted method” that was very similar to the one it banned. Therefore, the
burden in Gonzales was slight, while the government’s interest in fetal life was sufficient to justify the burden. Here, the Arizona law imposes a greater burden
and is not justified by any interest. . . . [F]or women between 49 and 63 days
LMP, the Arizona law prohibits medication abortion entirely, leaving surgical
abortion as the only legal alternative. In contrast to [the two surgical procedures
at issue in Gonzales], medication abortion and surgical abortion are very dissimilar procedures.
Id. Gonzales involved the federal ban on Partial Birth Abortion, which banned use of a
procedure involving delivery and killing of an intact fetus, but left in place procedures involving intentional dismemberment and removal of fetus parts. Id.
Abbott II, 748 F.3d at 590.
Id. (noting that Planned Parenthood, for support, cited Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462
U.S. at 431, a case the Ninth Circuit noted had been superceded by Casey).
Id.
Id.
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patient safety or regulation of the medical profession, focuses on the
106
two standard inquiries in the Casey analysis.
The application of the two-step analysis in Abbott II tracks Abbott I
closely, especially as to the conclusion that the Texas admitting privileges law did not present a substantial obstacle to women’s access to
107
abortion services.
However, the court in Abbott II more strongly
emphasized the traditional approach to assessing the basis for the
law, and the reason for the approach. The approach is very deferential, and a court’s job is simply to determine whether any conceivable
rationale exists. The court explained:
Because the determination does not lend itself to an evidentiary inquiry
in court, the state is not required to “prove” that the objective of the law
would be fulfilled. Most legislation deals ultimately in probabilities, the
estimation of the people’s representatives that a law will be beneficial to
the community. Success often cannot be “proven” in advance. The court
may not replace legislative predictions or calculations of probabilities
with its own [without usurping] the legislative power. . . . The fact that
reasonable minds can disagree on legislation, moreover, suffices to prove
that the law has a rational basis. . . . [T]here is no least restrictive means
108
component to rational basis review.

The Fifth Circuit also explained why this approach is particularly appropriate in the realm of constitutional adjudication:
If legislators’ predictions about a law fail to serve their purpose, the law
can be changed. Once the courts have held a law unconstitutional, however, only a constitutional amendment, or the wisdom of a majority of
justices overcoming the strong pull of stare decisis will permit that or simi109
lar laws to again take effect.

The district court clearly had not used this approach. The Fifth Circuit acknowledged the evidence presented by Planned Parenthood,
which tended to show that women experiencing complications from
106
107

108
109

Id.
Id. at 590, 595. The Fifth Circuit held the district court findings about clinic closings
vague and unsupported, but also noted that even if “both clinics in the Rio Grande Valley” were to close, the evidence did not show that any woman would lack reasonable access to a clinic in Texas. Id. at 597–98. Travel between the four counties in the Rio
Grande Valley and Corpus Christi (where abortion services remain available) involves at
most 150 miles and takes less than three hours on Texas highways. Id. at 597. Further,
90% of women seeking abortion in Texas would be able to access abortion services within
100 miles of their residence. Id. at 598. The court concluded that any “burden does not
fall on the vast majority of Texas women seeking abortions,” and thus the regulation
would “not affect a significant (much less ‘large’) fraction of such women, and it imposes
on other women in Texas less of a burden than the waiting-period provision upheld in
Casey.” Id. at 600. The court also pointed to the lack of evidence showing that abortion
providers would be unable to comply with the admitting privileges law. Id. at 598–99.
Id. at 594 (internal citations omitted).
Id.
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abortions generally can be treated successfully at emergency rooms.
But the state had presented evidence showing that the law had the
potential to improve patient care: evidence that most serious medical
errors involve miscommunication that occurs when patients are
handed from one caregiver to another; that an abortion provider
with admitting privileges would be in a better position to know which
specialists at the hospital could best help a woman with complications; and that most emergency rooms nationwide lack adequate oncall coverage by specialists such as Ob/Gyns, which very often is the
111
type of specialist a woman with complications would need. Under a
traditional rational basis inquiry, then, the state’s evidence clearly suf112
ficed.
The Fifth Circuit bolstered its conclusion by pointing to decisions
from the Fourth and Eighth Circuits which had upheld similar admit113
ting privileges laws, and expressly discounted the Seventh Circuit’s
114
Van Hollen decision. The Seventh Circuit had faulted the state for
not producing statistical evidence that the admitting-privileges law
would promote patient safety, and the Fifth Circuit objected, noting
that the first-step in the Casey analysis of an abortion regulation “is ra115
tional basis review, not empirical basis review.”
Within months another lawsuit was filed, raising as-applied challenges to the Texas admitting privileges law (as applied to the
McAllen and El Paso clinics), and facial and as-applied challenges to
another Texas abortion regulation, namely, rules directing that minimum standards for abortion facilities must be equivalent to mini116
mum standards for ambulatory surgery centers (“ASC”).
In Whole
110
111
112

113
114

115

116

Id. at 591.
Id. at 592–93, 595.
Id. at 594–95. The Fifth Circuit also found that the district court wrongly analyzed whether the law was unconstitutional due to a “purpose” of presenting a substantial obstacle.
The court emphasized that the burden of proof lies with parties challenging an abortion
regulation, and that the district court had gotten it “plainly backwards.” Id. at 597.
Id. at 595 (citing Greenville Women’s Clinic, 317 F.3d at 363; Webster, 871 F.2d at 1381).
Id. at 596. In part this was because Van Hollen involved facts that more readily warranted
granting a preliminary injunction regardless of the decision on the merits, e.g., the admitting privileges law at issue had been enacted on a Friday and became effective on the
following Monday—meaning that access to abortion services certainly would be disrupted
at least in the short-term. But the Fifth Circuit also disagreed with the approach used by
the court in Van Hollen. Id.
Id. (noting that the court in Van Hollen had “ignored case law from its own circuit holding, consistent with the Supreme Court’s oft-repeated guidance, that there is ‘never a role
for evidentiary proceedings’ under rational basis review”).
Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d at 676–78 (noting that the ambulatory-surgical center requirements
are codified at Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 245.010(a) & 25 Tex. Admin. Code §
139.40). All plaintiffs in the case challenged the ambulatory-surgical-center (ASC) provi-
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Woman’s Health v. Lakey, the district court enjoined the laws, finding
that the ASC provision places an undue burden on women throughout Texas; that the ASC and the admitting privileges law, as-applied
to the McAllen and El Paso clinics, place an undue burden on women
in the Rio Grande Valley; and that the provisions together place an
117
undue burden on women throughout Texas (a finding resulting in
an order in direct contradiction to Abbott II’s rejection of a facial chal118
lenge to the admitting privileges law).
In reaching these conclusions, the district court defiantly departed from Fifth Circuit precedent. The district court acknowledged
that, in light of Abbott II’s clarification, both the ASC and admitting
privileges requirements “surmount[ed] the low bar of rational-basis
119
review.” As such, the court’s conclusions would flow from the substantial obstacle analysis. In concluding that both laws presented a
substantial obstacle, the court focused on clinic closures and the fact
that the ASC requirements would make it difficult for new abortion
120
facilities to open. The court found that “a signification number of
the reproductive-age female population of Texas [would] need to
travel considerably further in order to exercise its right to a legal
previability abortion,” and discounted the state’s claim that facilities
121
remaining open could handle the demand.
To bolster its finding
that increased travel distances rose to the level of a substantial obstacle, the court pointed to a host of other practical difficulties that
might also be experienced by women: “lack of availability of child
care, unreliability of transportation,” inability to get “time off from
work, immigration status and inability to pass border checkpoints,
poverty,” the time and expenses associated with increased distances,
122
and “other, inarticulable psychological obstacles.” According to the
court, “[t]hese factors combine with increased travel distances to establish a de facto barrier to obtaining an abortion for a large number
of Texas women of reproductive age who might choose to seek a legal

117
118
119

120
121
122

sion on its face and as applied to medication abortions, and the admitting privileges requirement ASC provision was challenged as-applied to the McAllen and El Paso Clinics.
Id. at 678.
Id. at 687.
Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 769 F.3d 285, 293 (5th Cir. 2014), vacated in part, 135 S.
Ct. 399 (2014).
Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d at 680. Although the court expressly limited the finding to the asapplied challenges of the El Paso and Rio Grande Valley clinics, id., the finding logically
would apply to all challenges in the lawsuit.
Id. at 682, 684.
Id. at 681–82.
Id. at 682–83.
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123

abortion.” Yet, in reality, the court pointed only to factors relating
to practical difficulties and expenses; effects that, under Casey’s
124
benchmarks, do not present a substantial obstacle.
To bolster its conclusion, the district court again introduced the
balancing inquiry into the analysis. The court assessed the empirical
basis for the state’s argument that the laws furthered the state’s inter125
ests in the health and safety of women seeking abortions in Texas.
Regarding the admitting privileges law, the court found that—despite
the potential for increased safety recognized by the Fifth Circuit in
Abbott II—the law nonetheless fell short “compared to the burden the
requirement imposes on women [in the Rio Grande and El Paso] ar126
The court characterized the credentialing rational as “weak
eas.”
127
and speculative,” and thus concluded:
After thorough consideration of the severity of the burdens presented by
the act’s two requirements, the court concludes that the requirements,
independently and when viewed as they operate together, have the ultimate effect of erecting a substantial obstacle for women in Texas who
seek to obtain a previability abortion. . . . Finally, the court [also] concludes that the ambulatory-surgical-center requirement imposes an undue burden specifically as applied to the provision of medication abortions, where any medical justification for the requirement is at its
128
absolute weakest in comparison with the heavy burden it imposes.

123

124

125

126

127
128

Id. at 683 (emphasis in original). To counter the state’s argument that the Fifth Circuit
in Abbott I and II recognized a de facto safe harbor of 150 miles, the court stated: “It is
overly simplistic and reductionist to conclude that absolute distances or theoretical travel
times measured under ideal circumstances act identically on a population as diverse as
Texas’s. They simply do not.” Id. at 682–83.
Id. The court also did not frame its conclusion in the terms the Fifth Circuit used in Abbott
II: there is no assessment of whether “the burden,” although impacting significant numbers of women, “fall[s] on the vast majority of Texas women seeking abortions.” Abbott II,
748 F.3d at 600.
Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d at 684. The court credited the plaintiffs’ evidence that abortion in
Texas before enactment of the laws was relatively safe in terms of “low rates of serious
complications” or deaths, safer than “many common medical procedures not subject to
such intense regulation and scrutiny,” and that risks are not lower for patients undergoing abortions at ambulatory surgical centers. Id. Regarding the ASC requirements, the
court also noted that many of the facility standards have only a “tangential relationship to
patient safety in the context of abortion;” and that, because the effect of the laws included a potential for delay in access abortion services, any potential for increased safety was
offset by risks associated with delay. Id.
Id. at 685 (concluding that “the heavy burden imposed on the women of West Texas, El
Paso, and the Rio Grande Valley by the admitting privileges requirement is not appropriately balanced by a credible medical or health rationale”).
Id.
Id. at 685–86.
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The resulting order effectively enjoined enforcement state-wide of
129
both the admitting privileges and ASC requirements.
The state again sought stay of the injunctions pending appeal and
the Fifth Circuit in Lakey held that the state had made a strong show130
ing of likelihood of success on the merits as to all but one claim. In
the decision on the merits, Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, the Fifth Cir131
cuit opinion largely parallels the decision in Lakey.
In both decisions the court expressly rejected the Balancing Approach.
The court first noted that “facial invalidation of the admitting
privileges [law] was directly contrary” to Abbott II and thus clearly
132
wrong.
As to the ASC requirements, because the trial court had
acknowledged that the provision surmounted rational basis review,
the Fifth Circuit focused only on the second prong of the Casey analysis; and, further, focused primarily on whether the requirements had
the “effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
133
seeking an abortion.”
The Fifth Circuit highlighted several errors in the district court’s
analysis: e.g., the court further diluted the facial challenge standard,
134
as a matter of both the legal standard and the assessment of the ev-

129

130
131

132
133

134

Id. at 687–88; see also Lakey, 769 F.3d at 289–92, vacated in part, 135 S.Ct. 399 (2014) (highlighting uncertainty regarding the district court’s order, and electing to address a stay as
to injunctions of both laws “on their face” and as applied to the McAllen and El Paso clinics, and of the ASC requirement as applied to medication abortions).
Lakey, 769 F.3d at 301.
790 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 2015), mandate stayed, 135 S. Ct. 2923 (2015). In Cole, the court
vacated the district court’s enjoinment of enforcement of: (i) the admitting privileges
requirement and the ACS requirement “as applied to ‘all women seeking a previability
abortion,’” id. at 567; (ii) the ASC requirement as applied to medication abortions, id. at
591; and (iii) the admitting privileges and ACS requirement as-applied to the El Paso
abortion facility, id. at 567. The court allowed enforcement, but narrowed the district
court’s order, as to the admitting privileges and the ACS requirements as-applied to the
McAllen facility. Id. at 594–96.
Cole, 790 F.3d at 581; Lakey, 769 F.3d at 293.
Cole, 790 F.3d at 584; Lakey, 769 F.3d at 294. The district court had found that the ASC
requirement was unconstitutional under the purpose inquiry, and the Fifth Circuit rejected this view: “the Texas Legislature’s stated purpose was to improve patient safety;”
courts may not “second guess a legislature’s stated purposes absent clear and compelling
evidence to the contrary”; and the district court cited no such evidence and reached a
conclusion about disparate treatment based on an erroneous interpretation of the regulatory scheme. Cole, 790 F.3d at 584–86; Lakey, 769 F.3d at 294–95.
Lakey, 769 F.3d at 296. Applying “neither the Fifth Circuit’s ‘no set of circumstances’ test
nor Casey’s ‘large fraction’ test,” the district court instead rested its conclusion on its finding that “‘a significant number of the reproductive-age female population of Texas [would]
need to travel considerably further in order to exercise its right to a legal previability
abortion.’” Id. (emphasis in original).
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135

idence; the court improperly relied on a multitude of “practical
concerns” associated with increased travel, when a proper analysis
136
must be on obstacles imposed by the law itself; and the court’s finding regarding the inability of remaining clinics to serve women seek137
ing abortion was not supported by evidence in the record.
While
the record evidence did suggest that the overall cost of accessing an
abortion provider likely would increase, the Fifth Circuit reiterated
Supreme Court precedent noting that a law that serves a valid purpose is not facially invalid due to an “incidental effect of making it
138
more difficult or more expensive to procure an abortion.”
135

136

137

138

Id. at 298. To the appellate court, evidence presented during the trial was not sufficient
to show that a “large fraction” of women seeking abortion would face a substantial obstacle due to the ASC requirements. The Fifth Circuit explained that the numbers presented by plaintiffs’ expert suggested that, after the clinic closures, only 16.7% of women
seeking an abortion would live more than 150 miles from the nearest clinic, and that assuming 150 miles is the relevant cut-off, this surely would not suffice for facial invalidation of an abortion regulation. The court held, “The general standard for facial challenges allows courts to facially invalidate a statute only if ‘no possible application of the
challenged law would be constitutional.’ In other words, the law must be unconstitutional in 100% of its applications. We decline to interpret Casey as changing the threshold for
facial challenges from 100% to 17%.” Cole, 790 F.3d at 588; Lakey, 769 F.3d at 298 (internal citations omitted). The Fifth Circuit also rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that
would have narrowed the appropriate denominator in the “large fraction analysis” to only
“women ‘who could have accessed abortion services in Texas prior to the implementation
of the challenged requirements, but who will face increased obstacles as a result of the
law.’” Id. at 299. The Fifth Circuit explained that this approach makes the test “merely a
tautology.” Cole, 790 F.3d at 589; Lakey, 769 F.3d at 299. That is, to narrow the denominator to only those women who plaintiffs argue will face an undue burden would always result in a large fraction: “The demoninator would be women that Plaintiffs claim are unduly burdened by the statute, and the numerator would be the same.” Cole, 790 F.3d at
589; Lakey, 769 F.3d at 299.
Cole, 790 F.3d at 589 (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980)); Lakey, 769 F.3d
at 299; Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977) (“The indigency that may make it difficult—and in some cases, perhaps, impossible—for some women to have abortions is neither created nor in any way affected by the [state’s] regulation.”).
Lakey, 769 F.3d at 299–300 & n.17 (noting that “there [was] no evidence in the record
that women have faced delays, have been turned away for lack of capacity, or will face delays in the future”); see also Cole, 790 F.3d at 590.
Lakey, 769 F.3d at 300. The Fifth Circuit in Cole also disagreed with the district court’s
conclusion as to the burden resulting from the admitting privileges and ASC requirements as-applied to the El Paso facility. The court noted that an effect of the laws was the
closure of the facility, and that women in El Paso would face an increased travel distance
greater than 500 miles if they choose to use a clinic in Texas. Cole, 790 F.3d at 596, 598.
However, a clinic existed within the same metropolitan area as El Paso—across the state
line in Santa Teresa, New Mexico. Id. at 597–98. Although the court in Lakey decided it
was constrained from considering the Santa Teresa clinic due to a recent Fifth Circuit
opinion holding that the focus must remain on clinics within Texas, the court in Cole distinguished the case. 790 F.3d at 597 (noting that Texas still had some abortion providers
within the state) (citing Lakey, 769 F.3d at 304 (citing Jackson Women’s Health Org. v.
Currier, 760 F.3d 448, 457–58 (5th Cir. 2014)).

686

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 18:2

In rejecting the Balancing Approach, the Fifth Circuit again
acknowledged that other circuits have used the approach, but reiterated Abbott II’s emphasis on the inappropriateness “of secondguessing the wisdom of the legislature in a constitutional chal139
lenge.” The Fifth Circuit in Lakey also supplemented the reasoning
provided in Abbott II, explaining that, in essence, “the district court’s
approach ratchets up rational basis review into a pseudo-strictscrutiny approach . . . [and] we have no authority by which to turn
rational basis into strict scrutiny under the guise of the undue burden
140
inquiry.”
Although this characterization is not as accurate or helpful as it
could be, it makes a valid point. The district court did not purport to
conduct the first step of the Casey analysis, and thus the district
court’s use of the Balancing Approach did not ratchet up the inquiry
into the legislative basis for the laws. Nonetheless, the Balancing Approach radically changes the Casey analysis and does so by introducing aspects of strict scrutiny analysis: lower courts clearly are ratcheting up the relational inquiry by requiring empirical evidence showing
a substantial relationship to important state interests, and are critical
if the laws are not narrowly tailored.
In the Abbott and Lakey litigation, the Fifth Circuit advanced three
main reasons for rejecting incorporation of a balancing approach into the Casey analysis: (1) there is no reason to assess the constitutionality of abortion laws serving a state interest in women’s health and
139

140

Lakey, 769 F.3d at 297 (“The district court’s weighing of the interests basically boils down
to the district court’s own view that the facilities are already safe for women and that the
[ASC] provision, when implemented, will not serve to promote women’s health.”). The
court also rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that an earlier Fifth Circuit decision, Barnes v. Mississippi, 992 F.2d 1335, 1339 (5th Cir. 1993), supported use of the balancing approach.
Id. at 297–98. See also Cole, 790 F.3d at 587 (quoting Abbott II, 748 F.3d at 594; Gonzales,
550 U.S. at 163, 164, 166) (emphasizing that medical judgments are generally decided by
the legislature).
Lakey, 769 F.3d at 297, n.11 (citing Abbott II, 748 F.3d at 594) (noting that “[t]his is particularly problematic in a facial challenge to a newly enacted law,” given that “most legislation deals ultimately in probabilities, the estimation of the people’s representatives that
a law will be beneficial to the community”—and thus that “[s]uccess often cannot be
‘proven’ in advance”); see also Cole, 790 F.3d at 587 (quoting Lakey, 769 F.3d at 297).
A dissenting opinion in Lakey did not view Abbott II as precluding the district court’s
approach. The dissent construed Abbott II as rejecting empirical assessment as part of the
rational basis analysis (step-one of the Casey analysis), but as leaving the door open to an
assessment of the weight of the state’s interest as part of the “undue burden” prong. 769
F.3d at 307 (Higginson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The dissenting
opinion’s primary rationale for affirming use of the balancing analysis, however, was to
avoid a split in circuit authority; but the opinion also cites—as have other courts—the
statement in Casey that “[u]nnecessary health regulations that have the purpose or effect of
presenting a substantial obstacle . . . impose an undue burden.” Id. at 307.

Dec. 2015]

CASEY’S UNDUE BURDEN TEST

687

safety differently from laws serving a state interest in the life of the
unborn child; (2) the relational inquiry in the Casey analysis does not
require supporting empirical evidence and should be deferential to
state legislatures, particularly in the context of constitutional challenges to the laws; and (3) the Balancing Approach is an unwarranted back-door entry to strict scrutiny analysis of abortion regulation,
and results in significant dilution of the substantial obstacle test.
III. ASSESSMENT OF THEORIES
As noted, Judge Posner in Van Hollen provided no analysis or ex141
planation and cited to no authority for modifying the Casey analysis.
Rather, without question or explanation he simply adopted a view of
142
the law as articulated and applied by the district court. The district
143
court had provided at least some explanation. Additionally, courts
in two decisions issued in 2014 have provided thoughtful theories in
support of the Balancing Approach: the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap144
peals in Planned Parenthood Arizona, Inc. v. Humble, and the District
Court for the Middle District of Alabama in Planned Parenthood South145
east, Inc. v. Strange.
The explanations are but the flip side of the
reasons identified by the Fifth Circuit for declining to modify the Casey analysis. The theories turn on a perceived need to treat laws advancing women’s health and safety differently from laws advancing
respect for unborn human life; on a reading of Casey and Gonzales
that requires courts to balance or reconcile legitimate state interests
and a women’s interest in access to abortion as part and parcel of Casey’s undue burden analysis; and on a reading of Gonzales that requires states to produce evidence of both the need for the law to protect women’s health and the extent to which the law actually will
141

142

143
144
145

See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text; see also Van Hollen, 738 F.3d at 798. After
noting that the Casey analysis involves two distinct steps, Judge Posner cited important
Supreme Court cases (Casey, Carhart, and Mazurek). Id. However, he did not attempt to
tie his modification of the undue burden analysis to those cases. Id. at 798–99.
Id. The district court’s conclusion regarding the second prong of the Casey analysis clearly hinged on the balancing approach: “Even if there were some evidence that the admitting privileges requirement would actually further women’s health, any benefit is greatly
outweighed by the burdens caused . . . .” Van Hollen, 2013 WL 3989238, at *13, 19.
Id. at *9.
753 F.3d 905 (9th Cir. 2014).
See Strange, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1330, 1332–33 (M.D. Ala. 2014) (deciding, after a ten-day trial,
that the challenged state law created a substantial obstacle for women seeking abortions)
order amended, No. 2:13cv405–MHT, 2014 WL 5426891 (M.D. Ala. Oct 24, 2014,), and supplemented, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1381 (M.D. Ala. 2014)); Strange, 9 F. Supp. 3d at 1275, 1299 (resolving parties’ motions for summary judgment, and deciding a trial was warranted on
Planned Parenthood’s undue burden claim).
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succeed. This part of the Article describes and assesses the merits of
the theories which, in the end, hinge on proper interpretation of Casey and Gonzales.
A. Reading Casey as Requiring the Balancing Approach
1. A Purported Directive to Analyze Health Laws Differently
The need to treat health laws differently as a reason for modifying
the Casey analysis was most clearly articulated and relied on by the
Ninth Circuit in the Humble decision. As noted, the court in Humble
faulted the district court for not following an earlier case purportedly
146
refining the Casey analysis, namely, Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden.
The court in Humble read Eden as requiring the Balancing Approach
because of the nature of the law being challenged. The law at issue
in Humble (requiring medication induced abortions to be administered in compliance with the on-label regimen) was enacted to advance state interests related to women’s health. In Eden, the Ninth
Circuit had suggested that the undue burden analysis might not apply
in the same way to a challenge involving women’s health laws. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit in Eden had made the following statement.
[Casey’s] application of the “undue burden” standard is often not extendable in obvious ways to the context of a law purporting to promote
maternal health.
In the context of a law purporting to promote fetal life, whatever obstacles that law places in the way of women seeking abortions logically serve
the interest the law purports to promote—fetal life—because they will
prevent some women from obtaining abortions. By contrast, in the context of a law purporting to promote maternal health, a law that is poorly
drafted or which is a pretext for anti-abortion regulation can both place
obstacles in the way of women seeking abortions and fail to serve the
147
purported interest very closely, or at all.

The court in Humble interpreted Eden as thereby establishing a modified way of applying the substantial obstacle analysis, wherein “the extent of the burden a law imposes on a woman’s right to abortion [is
compared] with the strength of the state’s justification for the law
[and] [t]he more substantial the burden, the stronger the state’s justification for the law must be to satisfy the undue burden test; [and]
conversely, the stronger the state’s justification, the greater the bur-

146
147

Humble, 753 F.3d at 912–14 (discussing Eden, 379 F.3d at 539–40, 542); see supra notes 96–
97 and accompanying text.
Id. at 912 (quoting Eden, 379 F.3d at 539–40 (citations omitted)).
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148

den may be before it becomes ‘undue.’”
The Ninth Circuit in
Humble expressly claimed that the court in Eden “described” this ap149
proach to applying the substantial obstacle analysis.
This basis for the Balancing Approach is untenable. The Ninth
Circuit in Eden did not describe the undue burden analysis in the way
claimed by the court in Humble, and clearly did not apply it in that
way. Rather, the court in Eden simply highlighted the importance of
ensuring that a law purporting to protect the state’s interest in women’s health does in fact further that interest. In doing so, the court
emphasized two aspects of the Casey analysis. The court noted that
the Casey plurality expressly indicated that the substantial obstacle
150
analysis applies even as to health regulations. The court in Eden also noted that, following Casey, rational basis review of a state law
might in some cases eliminate the need for the substantial obstacle
analysis: “the undue burden standard is not triggered at all if a purported health regulation fails to rationally promote an interest in maternal health on its face, as would be the case where the state required physicians to provide false or misleading information to
151
women seeking abortions.”
Because the challenged laws in Eden undeniably constituted a “typical set of health and safety regulations,” the Ninth Circuit focused on
152
the second prong of the Casey analysis.
However, nothing in the
court’s discussion of the substantial obstacle analysis reflects applica148

149
150

151

152

Id. at 912–13 (“[In hard cases], we must weigh the burdens against the state’s justification, asking whether and to what extent the challenged regulation actually advances the
state’s interests. If a burden significantly exceeds what is necessary to advance the state’s
interests, it is ‘undue.’” (citing Eden, 379 F.3d at 542 and WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L
DICTIONARY 2492 (1993) (noting that “undue” is defined as “excessive” or “unwarranted”))).
Id. at 912.
Eden, 379 F.3d at 539. As to this point, the court quoted the following confusing statement from Casey: “As with any medical procedure, the State may enact regulations to further the health or safety of a woman seeking an abortion. Unnecessary health regulations
that have the purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an
abortion impose an undue burden on the right.” Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 878).
Id. at 540 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 882) (noting, that“[i]f the information the State requires to be made available to the woman is truthful and not misleading, the requirement
may be permissible”). The court also relied on Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968 (1997),
to make this point. The court in Eden explained that, in Mazurek, the Supreme Court applied the substantial obstacle analysis to a law “even in the face of evidence that it was objectively unnecessary.” Eden, 379 F.3d at 540–41.
Eden, 379 F.3d at 537, 541 (noting the laws required facilities performing five or more
first trimester abortions in any month or any second or third trimester abortion to be licensed as health care institutions, and also imposed other requirements relating to administration, personnel, staffing, the procedure itself, transfer and discharge, medical
records, equipment, and physical facilities).
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tion of the balancing attributed to Eden by the court in Humble. Rather, the court in Eden reversed the lower court decision because the
district court failed to make inferences regarding increased costs,
failed to consider whether a significant increase in cost could, alone,
present a substantial obstacle, and failed to consider other potential
153
Thus, although the
burdens allegedly caused by the regulations.
court in Eden certainly used language that could be used to support
154
modifying the Casey analysis, the Eden court did not articulate or
apply a Balancing Approach.
Perhaps recognizing its exaggeration of Eden, the Ninth Circuit also expressly sought to connect the balancing to Casey. Foremost, the
court latched onto the statement in Casey that “[u]nnecessary health
regulations that have the purpose or effect of presenting a substantial
obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion impose an undue burden
155
on the right.” The court in Humble elaborated on this statement by
noting: “Whether a regulation is necessary depends on whether and
156
how well it serves the state’s interest.” The court also pulled another sentence from Casey: “[T]he means chosen by the State to further
the interest in potential life must be calculated to inform the wom157
an’s free choice, not hinder it.”
The court extended this idea to
laws enacted to protect women’s health: according to the Ninth Circuit, “they ‘must be calculated’ to advance women’s health, ‘not hin158
der it.’”
This basis for the Balancing Approach also is unpersuasive. Latching onto one sentence in Casey as a reason for treating health laws differently is poor legal analysis. Sound analysis depends not on plucking one sentence from a Supreme Court case, but on a full analysis of
the relevant portions of the key governing decisions, namely, Casey
and Gonzales.

153
154

155
156
157
158

Id. at 541–43.
In addition to the text the Humble court relied on, the court in Eden also noted: “Indeed,
in his concurring opinion in Casey, Justice Stevens indicated that a burden need not be
onerous to be undue, if it is not supported by a legitimate state interest.” Eden, 379 F.3d
at 540 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 920–21 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part)). The court in Humble did not rely on this statement in Eden, presumably recognizing that Justice Stevens’s view could not legitimately be taken as a good indication of the
views reflected in the Casey plurality opinion.
Humble, 753 F.3d at 913 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 878 (emphasis omitted)).
Id.
Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 877).
Id. The court’s citation to Casey for the extension to health laws is an overstatement. At
most the proper citation signal would have been “cf.”
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Casey’s explanation of the undue burden analysis spans five and
159
The sentence relied on by the Ninth Circuit is in
one-half pages.
160
In the lengthy
one paragraph in Justice O’Connor’s “summary.”
discussion preceding the summary, Justice O’Connor expressly makes
clear that the undue burden analysis will apply to all laws bearing on
abortion. For example, in introducing the analysis Justice O’Connor
notes that “[n]umerous forms of state regulation” might have the incidental effect of increasing the cost or decreasing the availability of
abortion services, and “[t]he fact that a law which serves a valid purpose . . . has the incidental effect of making it more difficult or more
expensive to procure an abortion cannot be enough to invalidate
161
it.” More of the discussion speaks of the state’s interest in the unborn human life within the woman, because Justice O’Connor was
concerned in particular with remedying the undervaluation of that
162
state interest in Roe and subsequent Supreme Court cases. But Justice O’Connor clearly intended the proposed analysis to apply to any
state law bearing on the decision to abort. She stated:
[I]t is an overstatement to describe [the right at stake] as a right to decide whether to have an abortion “without interference from the State.”
All abortion regulations interfere to some degree with a woman’s ability to
decide whether to terminate her pregnancy. . . . Not all governmental
163
intrusion is of necessity unwarranted . . . .

Similarly, in a closing paragraph Justice O’Connor states that “[s]ome
164
She first
guiding principles should emerge” from the discussion.
addresses laws that reflect the state’s “profound respect for the life of
165
the unborn.”
But she concludes with a reference to health laws:
“Regulations designed to foster the health of a woman seeking an
166
abortion are valid if they do not constitute an undue burden.” Giving dispositive weight to one sentence in a “summary” of the opinion
thus reflects poor legal analysis. Justice O’Connor’s overall discussion simply does not create a distinction between laws based on the
particular state interest at stake.

159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166

Casey, 505 U.S. at 874–79.
See id. at 878 (contrasting permissive health regulations to further health and safety of
mother with unnecessary health regulations that impose an undue burden).
Id. at 874.
See, e.g., id. at 875–77 (clarifying the distinction between regulating abortions and denying
women of the right to choose whether to terminate pregnancy).
Id. at 875 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Id. at 877.
Id. at 877–78.
Id. at 878.
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Gonzales confirms this reading of Casey. The ban in Gonzales served
a variety of state interests: protecting and preserving unborn human
life; maintaining the integrity of the medical profession and society’s
confidence in the medical community; fostering a woman’s interest
in fully understanding the brutal nature of the banned abortion procedure; and avoiding a “coursening of society” associated with freely
167
allowing a procedure akin to infanticide. Yet the analysis in Gonzales did not turn on the nature of the interest at stake. Rather, the
analysis focused on whether the ban furthered in some way those le168
gitimate state interests.
To that extent, the Ninth Circuit’s statement that health laws must be “calculated” to advance women’s
health is not wholly off base. But upon concluding that the ban did
further the many interests at stake, the Court in Gonzales simply fo169
cused on the effect of the ban. As explained in greater depth in the
next Part, the analysis in Gonzales did not involve any balancing or any
assessment of “whether and how well” the law served the state inter170
ests. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit’s view of Casey as requiring a Balancing Approach for laws designed to foster women’s health is un171
dermined by careful reading of Casey and Gonzales.
2. Balancing in Casey
Rather than focusing on one sentence in Casey, the district court
in Strange relied more heavily on the overall balancing that is reflected in Casey. The court in Strange addressed the constitutionality of an
172
The law required every physiAlabama admitting privileges law.

167
168
169
170
171

172

See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 157–160 (discussing congressional intent).
See id. (declaring explicitly that congressional goals were furthered).
See id. (drawing inferences about potential changes in the practice of late term abortions).
See infra notes 187–237 and accompanying text.
Further, even if it is true that, as stated by the Ninth Circuit in Eden, in the context of a
law purporting to promote maternal health, “a law that is poorly drafted or which is a
pretext for anti-abortion regulation can both place obstacles in the way of women seeking
abortions and fail to serve the purported interest very closely, or at all,” 379 F.3d at 540, it
is not clear why the balancing approach becomes the appropriate solution. The decisions
in Casey and Gonzales emphasize the need for abortion jurisprudence to accommodate
laws furthering legitimate state interests. The decisions make clear that such laws should
be upheld unless they have the effect of presenting a substantial obstacle. If concern exists about whether a state law is a “pretext” for antiabortion regulation, the decisions—
especially Gonzales—suggest that the task for courts is careful scrutiny as to the relational
inquiry. But the decisions do not support an empirical inquiry or an assessment of the
extent to which the laws further the state interests.
See Strange, 9 F. Supp. 3d at 1274–75 (denying summary judgment against substantive due
process claim on similar admitting privileges law).
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cian who performs either medication or surgical abortions to have
staff privileges “at an acute care hospital within the same standard
metropolitan statistical area as the facility is located” and that would
permit the physician to perform procedures “reasonably necessary to
173
treat abortion related complications.”
As in the Van Hollen and
Humble cases, adoption of the Balancing Approach proved determinative. The court engaged in a lengthy analysis, and reached a conclusion similar to that in Van Hollen: that the Alabama staff privileges
law created a substantial obstacle because the state’s justifications
were weak and the burden imposed severe.
The district court in Strange viewed Casey as establishing and applying the Balancing Approach. The court did not rely as heavily as the
Humble court on the confusing sentence in Casey regarding “unnecessary health regulations,” but, rather, relied in part on the Casey opinion’s overall objective of finding a “middle way”: a way between Justice Blackmun’s plea for preservation of Roe’s strict scrutiny analysis
174
and Justice Rehnquist’s call for use of rational basis review. A middle ground between an approach that undervalues the state’s legitimate interests in regulating abortion and an approach that is overly
175
deferential to state regulation.
The court in Strange repeatedly
characterizes Casey’s middle approach as involving a balancing of
both a woman’s right to an abortion and state interests; and points to
176
that balancing as dictating use of the Balancing Approach.
And of course it is true that Casey involved balancing. In Casey,
Justice O’Connor sought to preserve the essence of Roe while modifying abortion jurisprudence in a way that would better accommodate
state laws furthering legitimate state interests. In Part IV of the opinion, Justice O’Connor characterized Roe as establishing that a woman’s liberty interest includes some freedom to terminate her preg173
174
175
176

See id. at 1276 (quoting § 4(c) of the Women’s Health and Safety Act, codified at 1975
Ala. Code § 26-23E-4(c)).
See id. at 1281–83. (arguing that the Justice O’Connor decision is best understood in response to both dissenting opinions).
Id. at 1280.
Id. at 1282–83. The court points to Casey’s basic explanation that the undue burden analysis focuses on whether the challenged law poses a substantial obstacle, id. at 1282 (citing
Casey, 505 U.S. at 877), to (c) of Justice O’Connor’s “summary” of her explanation of the
undue burden analysis (which includes the confusing sentence about “unnecessary”
health laws), id. (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 878), and also to the fact that the undue burden
analysis is an approach between the retention of strict scrutiny championed by Justice
Blackmun and use of only the rational basis inquiry as championed by Justice William
Rehquist. Id. at 1282–83 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 926 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part
and in the judgment and dissenting in part); Casey, 505 U.S. at 966 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)).
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nancy, but also affirmed that a woman’s freedom must give way to
177
Jussome state laws designed to further legitimate state interests.
tice O’Connor retained viability as the point before which the wom178
an’s freedom to terminate exists. That is, a state may not prohibit
abortion previability. In large part the retention of viability as the key
temporal point limiting a state ban was due to O’Connor’s view of
stare decisis: “We have twice reaffirmed [Roe] in the face of great op179
position.” But she also repeated the explanation given in Roe: that
viability is the point when there is a
realistic possibility of maintaining and nourishing a life outside the
womb, so that the independent existence of the second life can in reason
and all fairness be the object of state protection that now overrides the
rights of the woman. . . . And there is no other line than viability which is
180
more workable.

It is thus fair to characterize Justice O’Connor’s decision to retain the
point of viability as involving a balancing: according to Roe and Justice O’Connor in Casey, it is at this point that the state’s interest can
logically be said to override a woman’s interest in terminating her
pregnancy, i.e., at this point the state’s interest becomes sufficiently
181
weighty to justify a ban on termination.
Similarly, when Justice O’Connor rejected Roe’s trimester framework which precluded any state regulation in the first trimester, and
most other laws previability, the emerging question involved the
“weight” of the state’s interest in protecting human life; i.e., identifying when a state regulation of abortion ought to be allowed notwith182
standing some effect on access to abortion.
Justice O’Connor rejected Roe’s crabbed approach and the trimester framework because
they undervalued state interests and overvalued the women’s interest
183
at stake.
She replaced the trimester framework with the undue
184
burden analysis. This also involved a balancing. In her own words,
the undue burden analysis “is the appropriate means of reconciling
177
178
179
180
181

182

183
184

Casey, 505 U.S. at 869.
Id. at 870.
Id. (citing Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 759; Akron I, 462 U.S. at 419–20).
Id. (citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 163).
Id. (upholding Roe while overruling cases that did not adequately weigh the state’s interest in regulating abortion); see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 163 (declaring viability as the point at
which the state’s “important and legitimate interest in potential life” is compelling
enough to justify regulation).
Casey, 505 U.S. at 871 (noting that the “weight to be given the state interest [in protecting
human life], not the strength of the woman’s interest, was the difficult question faced in
Roe;” and that the Court in Roe discounted the state interest).
Id. at 872–73.
See id. at 873–76; see also id. at 877–79.
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the State’s interest with the woman’s constitutionally protected liber185
ty.”
Thus, yes, the Casey opinion reflects balancing. Balancing is what
led to adoption of the undue burden analysis. The question, however,
is whether Casey’s undue burden analysis itself involves balancing.
The key sentences from Casey describing the undue burden analysis were set out in Part I of this Article. Nothing in Justice
O’Connor’s description of the undue burden analysis suggests that
the analysis involves weighing the extent to which a particular law
achieves or furthers a state interest and balancing that against the
burden the law imposes on access to abortion. Rather, in picking the
undue burden analysis, Justice O’Connor in essence determined that
state laws should be allowed as long as they further a legitimate state
interest—and so long as they do not have the effect of presenting a
substantial obstacle to the woman’s interest in being able to legally
decide to terminate a pregnancy.
What is at stake is the woman’s right to make the ultimate decision, not a
right to be insulated from all others in doing so. Regulations which do
no more than create a structural mechanism by which the State . . . may
express profound respect for the life of the unborn are permitted, if they
are not a substantial obstacle to the woman’s right to choose. . . . Regulations designed to foster the health of a woman seeking an abortion are
186
valid if they do not constitute an undue burden.

Stated another way, Justice O’Connor’s approach is the flip side of
the approach in Roe. Under Roe, state laws promoting interests such
as the interest in human life or the interest in health and safety or in
regulating the medical profession were never sufficiently weighty in
the first trimester, and rarely ever sufficiently weighty previability.
Under Casey, state laws furthering legitimate interests should be respected and given effect as long as they do not pose a substantial obstacle.
The approach nonetheless is rightly considered a “middle-way.”
Due to the addition of the substantial obstacle inquiry it provides
more protection for the woman’s interest than the mere rational basis review approach advocated by Justice Rehnquist. It also provides
more room for state regulation than the strict scrutiny approach advocated by Justices Blackmun and Stevens by rejecting the need for a
state to show that the interest is compelling or that the law is narrowly
tailored. But Casey’s adoption of a middle-way does not support use
of the Balancing Approach as part of the undue burden analysis.
185
186

Id. at 876.
Id. at 877–78.

696

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 18:2

Further, the Balancing Approach substantially undermines the balance struck in Casey, and reintroduces aspects of strict scrutiny analysis clearly rejected in Casey.
B. Reading Gonzales as Requiring Balancing and Empirical Evidence
The Ninth Circuit in Humble and the district court in Van Hollen
point to Gonzales for support of the Balancing Approach and, in particular, as requiring heightened scrutiny of the basis for a challenged
abortion regulation. Reading Gonzales as a reason for modifying the
Casey analysis was most clearly articulated and relied on by the district
187
court in Van Hollen. As noted, Van Hollen involved a challenge to a
Wisconsin law prohibiting a physician from performing an abortion
unless the physician has admitting privileges at a hospital no more
than thirty miles from the clinic in which the abortion is performed.
The discussion of Van Hollen in Part II focused on Judge Posner’s review of the state’s justification of the law and his endorsement of the
Balancing Approach. Here, the focus is on the explanation of the
governing law provided by the district court—which Judge Posner
implicitly affirmed.
1. Balancing in Gonzales
The district court in Van Hollen set the stage for the Balancing
Approach by its explanation of Casey. In explaining the undue burden analysis, the court noted that in Casey the Supreme Court “appears to have stepped back from requiring a ‘compelling state interest’ to justify any limitation on access to abortion,” but that “[h]ow far
188
back remains open to debate” ; and that the Court in Casey “expressly adopted [a] new, arguably less rigorous ‘undue burden’ standard,”
and “acknowledged the government’s latitude to regulate abortion
even during the first trimester for reasons of maternal health or fetal
189
viability.”
But, the court also emphasized that Casey did not over190
rule Roe v. Wade.
187
188
189
190

See Van Hollen, 2013 WL 3989238, at *15.
Id. at *12.
Id.
Id. The court’s explanation is clearly erroneous on at least two counts. First, the “undue
burden” analysis was not expressly adopted by the Court in Casey, given that Part IV of
Justice O’Connor’s opinion did not garner a majority of the Court. See supra notes 33–34
and accompanying text. Second, the court also states that, under current Supreme Court
jurisprudence, “a woman’s right to an abortion remains fundamental to the point of viability.” Van Hollen, 2013 WL 3989238, at *13. This is incorrect, given that at least seven
Justices in Casey backed away from Roe’s “overvaluation” of a woman’s legitimate interest
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Thereafter, the district court focused on Gonzales. In some respects, the district court’s description of Gonzales adhered closely to
the two-pronged analysis used by lower courts: “where the government ‘has a rational basis to act’ and the restriction ‘does not impose
an undue burden,’ the government ‘may use its regulatory power to
bar certain procedures and substitute others, all in furtherance of its
legitimate interest in regulating the medical profession in order to
191
promote respect for life, including life of the unborn.’”
But the
court elsewhere described Gonzales as incorporating balancing into
the Casey analysis. In particular, the court described the outcome in
Gonzales as follows: “Ultimately, Justice Kennedy found that the question of constitutionality came down to whether the government’s unquestioned interest in ‘potential life’ and ‘protecting the integrity
and ethics of the medical profession,’ . . . outweighed any health risks
192
to women by the prohibition of [the] procedure.”
And the court
relied on this view of Gonzales in assessing the state law at issue:
[T]he court considers these obstacles in access to abortion services [an]
undue burden in light of the dubious benefits to women’s health [from]
the admitting privileges restriction . . . . Even if there were some evidence that the admitting privileges requirement would actually further
women’s health, any benefit is greatly outweighed by the burdens caused
by increased travel, decreased access and, at least for some women, the
193
denial of an in-state option for abortion services.

The district court’s conclusion in Van Hollen thus clearly hinged on
the Balancing Approach.
The district court in Van Hollen supported its statement that the
outcome in Gonzales turned on whether the government’s interest
outweighed health risks to women by citing to discussion in Gonzales
addressing and finding that the ban furthers legitimate state interests
194
in human life and integrity of the medical profession. The district
continued by explaining that the majority in Gonzales deferred to
Congress’s findings that the banned procedure had a “disturbing similarity to the killing of a newborn infant” and would not impose sig195
nificant health risks on women.
The court then stated: “Accord-

191
192
193
194
195

relating to a decision to abort a pregnancy. For these seven Justices, a woman simply has
“some freedom to terminate a pregnancy,” Casey, 505 U.S. at 869, and for four of these
Justices, state regulation of access to abortion can be justified if the law is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Id. at 981.
Id. at *13 (citations omitted).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at *19.
Id. at *13 (citing Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 157, 159).
Id. (citing Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 158, 162).
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ingly, the burden . . . was held not to be ‘undue,’ at least where alternatives are ‘available to the prohibited procedure that have extremely
low rates of medical complications’ and are ‘generally the safest
196
method of abortion during the second trimester.’” The implication
is that the outcome in Gonzales hinged on balancing a strong state interest against a minimal burden on women.
However, careful analysis of Gonzales readily negates this characterization. The Court in Gonzales did not conduct a distinct analysis
of what the lower courts consider as the first step in the Casey analysis.
Rather, the decision turned on application of the second prong of
the analysis: assessing whether the purpose or effect of the challenged law is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
197
seeking a previability abortion (Part IV of the opinion). The analysis of the purpose of the law (Part IV(A)) turned on whether the law
198
After finding that the
furthered legitimate government interests.
ban did so, the Court concluded: “[W]e reject the contention that
the congressional purpose of the Act was ‘to place a substantial obsta199
cle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion.’”
The analysis next focused on whether the ban had the effect of
imposing an undue burden given the absence of a health exception
200
(Part IV(B)).
The majority explained that, “under precedent we
here assume to be controlling,” the ban would be unconstitutional “if
201
it ‘subject[ed] [women] to significant health risks.”
The analysis
turned on the evidence. Although the challengers presented evidence that the banned procedure may be the safest method for some
women in certain situations, the government presented contradicting
202
evidence.
The Court determined that the challengers’ evidence
203
was insufficient to show that the law presented in undue burden.
The Court stated: “The medical uncertainty over whether the Act’s
prohibition creates significant health risks provides a sufficient basis
to conclude in this facial attack that the Act does not impose an un-

196
197

198
199
200
201
202
203

Id. (citing Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 164).
Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 156. The majority also considered arguments that the federal ban is
unconstitutionally vague and imposes an undue burden because its restrictions are overbroad. See id. at 148–50, 150–56.
Id. at 157–60.
Id. at 160 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 878).
Id. at 161–64.
Id. at 161 (quoting Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of New England, 546 U.S. 320, 328
(2006)).
Id. at 161–62 (noting also that courts had struggled with the issue).
Id. at 164. The majority also clarified that, rather than mounting a facial attack, the challengers should have pursued an “as-applied” challenge. Id. at 167–68.

Dec. 2015]

CASEY’S UNDUE BURDEN TEST

699

due burden.” The majority bolstered that conclusion by pointing to
other facts, namely, the availability of another safe method of abortion commonly used in the second trimester.
Nothing in the decision ties the two portions of the analysis together (Parts IV(A) and IV(B)) in any way that would support characterizing the outcome as hinging on the Balancing Approach. Nothing in the analysis even remotely looks like the majority is assessing
whether the government’s interest outweighed any health risks to
women stemming from the federal ban.
At the outset of the opinion (Part II), Justice Kennedy does de204
scribe Casey as striking a balance. The discussion of Casey leading to
that statement readily paints the Casey analysis as reflecting a need to
better accommodate state regulation of abortion that furthers legitimate government interests—particularly government’s legitimate and
205
substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal life.
But
again, recognizing the Casey analysis as effectuating a balance between a woman’s interest in access to abortion and the state’s interest
in human life is not an invitation to introduce an additional balancing into the analysis established by Casey.
To the Court in Gonzales, the crux of the challenge turned on
whether the ban could survive a facial attack when the challengers’
evidence had cast substantial doubt on the state’s premise that a safe
206
alternative method was always available. The Court pointed to the
traditional principle of giving legislatures “wide discretion” in areas of
medical and scientific uncertainty, noting that this traditional rule is
consistent with Casey’s recognition that abortion jurisprudence must
accommodate reasonable regulations furthering legitimate state in207
terests. The challengers’ evidence was therefore held to be insuffi208
cient to show that the effect of the law presented an undue burden.
No balancing was involved in reaching this conclusion.
2. Heightened Rational Basis Review
The district court in Van Hollen also read Gonzales as directing
courts to use a heightened standard when reviewing the basis for the
challenged law. At the trial in Van Hollen, the state had presented evidence that the admitting privileges law helps to foster continuity of
204
205
206
207
208

Id. at 146.
Id. at 145–46.
Id. at 162.
Id. at 163.
Id. at 164.
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care and provision of competent care by the abortion provider. The
district court explained that, to the state, the evidence was sufficient
given language in Gonzales according wide discretion to legislatures in
209
areas where there is “medical and scientific uncertainty.”
The district court rejected the state’s view, noting on the one hand that the
state’s submissions had failed to establish “a credible, medical disa210
greement.”
But on the other hand, the court stressed two things.
First, that the Court in Gonzales emphasized that courts have a duty to
211
“review factual findings where constitution[al] rights are at stake.”
Second, that “Gonzales involved the weighing of medical uncertainty
with respect to the potential negative impact on women’s health [resulting from the ban] against the state’s compelling interests in respecting the life of the unborn and in the integrity and ethics of the
212
medical community.”
In this sentence, the district court seems to
be suggesting two distinct ideas: (1) that the outcome in Gonzales
turned on a balancing (which has already been discussed), and (2)
that deference to the legislature in light of uncertainty was only appropriate because the case involved “compelling state interests.”
That the district court used a heightened standard is confirmed by
the court’s statement that “[e]ven under a more lenient standard of
review, the ‘reasonably related’ requirement . . . still has signifi213
cance.”
Here also the district court’s statements and analysis reflect a serious misunderstanding of Gonzales. As noted, the Court in Gonzales
did not conduct a distinct analysis of the first step—or a relational inquiry—of the Casey analysis. Rather, the decision turned on the
Court’s assessment of whether the purpose or effect of the challenged law was to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
214
seeking a pre-viability abortion.
The analysis of the purpose of the
law turned on whether the law furthered legitimate government in215
terests. The analysis of the effect of the law turned on an assessment
of the evidence bearing on whether banning the procedure created a
209
210
211
212
213
214

215

Van Hollen, 2013 WL 3989238, at *15.
Id.
Id. at *13,*15.
Id. at *15.
Id. at *15.
Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 156. The majority also considered arguments that the federal ban is
unconstitutionally vague, id. at 148–50, and imposes an undue burden, because its restrictions are overbroad. Id. at 150–56.
As noted, the opinion thereby suggests a refinement to the Casey analysis that merges the
relational inquiry into the basis of the law and purpose inquiry often considered part of
the substantial obstacle inquiry. See infra Part IV.
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significant health risk; and it is in this portion of the opinion that the
Court explicitly discussed deference to legislatures. Importantly,
both portions of the analysis shed light on the appropriate level of
scrutiny to be used by courts when assessing the basis for a challenged
abortion law.
The Court’s purpose analysis confirms the appropriateness of deferential review of the basis for the law. In the first part of the analysis,
Justice Kennedy identified the relevant state interests and confirmed
that precedent, including Casey, affirms the legitimacy of state inter216
ests in human life and the integrity of the medical profession. Regarding laws protecting the integrity of the medical profession, Justice Kennedy stated:
Where it has a rational basis to act, and it does not impose an undue
burden, the State may use its regulatory power to bar certain procedures
and substitute others, all in furtherance of its legitimate interests in regulating the medical profession in order to promote respect for life, includ217
ing life of the unborn.

The analysis then turned to the question whether the law furthered
the government’s objectives. Because the law only interfered with a
decision about an abortion procedure used in a very small number of
cases, and because the law left in place a standard procedure that is
218
equally brutal as the banned procedure, the challengers had argued
that the law did little to promote the government’s interest in the life
of the unborn. The Court determined, however, that the law passed
scrutiny and, in doing so, the Court gave considerable deference to
the legislature.
To the objection that the law was not rational because it left in
place equally brutal methods of abortion, the Court invoked the
principle that legislatures are given room to draw boundaries or
bright lines. Here, the line was justified by a congressional finding
that the partial birth abortion method was “disturbing[ly] similar[] to
the killing of a newborn infant,” and Congress’s concern in distin216

217
218

Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 157–58 (stating that the government “may use its voice and its regulatory authority to show its profound respect for . . . life” and that Casey’s recognition that
abortion jurisprudence must accommodate state laws that further that interest “cannot be
set at naught” by Casey’s requirement of a health exception).
Id. at 158.
Id. at 134–35, 140 (explaining that 85–90% of abortions occur in the first trimester; that
most of the remaining 10–15% occur in the second trimester; that usual procedure used
for second trimester abortions was not banned (the standard D & E procedure); and that
another procedure exists and often is used for late second trimester abortions (medical
induction)). The majority’s description of both the standard D & E procedure and the
banned “intact” D & E procedure made very clear that both procedures are very brutal.
Id. at 135–40.
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219

guishing abortion from infanticide. The opinion explains that the
banned procedure—intact D & E—differs from a standard D & E
“because the former occurs when the fetus is partially outside the
mother to the point of one of the Act’s anatomical landmarks;” and
thus it was “reasonable for Congress to think that partial-birth abortion, more than standard D & E, ‘undermines the public’s perception
of the appropriate role of a physician during the delivery process,
220
and perverts a process during which life is brought into the world.’”
In a similarly deferential way, Justice Kennedy based the determination that the law furthered respect for human life on a “reasonable
inference.” More specifically, the opinion explains that the existence
of the law would promote both (i) public knowledge of details of the
partial-birth abortion procedure (which he suggests very often are
not explained to women in clear and precise terms by abortion doctors), and (ii) helpful public dialogue; and, therefore, “[i]t is a reasonable inference that a necessary effect of the regulation and the
knowledge it conveys will be to encourage some women to carry the
infant to full term . . . ,” or to encourage the medical profession to
find “different and less shocking methods to abort the fetus in the se221
cond trimester . . . .”
The Court’s analysis of purpose, then, does not suggest a role for
heightened judicial scrutiny into the assessment of whether a challenged law furthers a legitimate state interest. Importantly, the opinion does reflect that, in rational basis review, the judicial analysis is
not a rubberstamp. A court may, and should, assess the rationality of
the argument that a law furthers a legitimate state interest. But in
concluding that a reasonable connection existed between the ban
and legitimate state interests, the Court did not require evidence
demonstrating the level of success in achieving the state interests and
did not inquire as to the fit between the law and the interests. Reasonable assertions and reasonable inferences will suffice. Characterizing the decision as creating a role for heightened scrutiny or a need
for empirical evidence is thus misplaced.

219
220

221

Id. at 158.
Id. at 160. Justice Kennedy also drew support from Washington v. Glucksberg, noting that
that case upheld a similar instance of line-drawing as being reasonable. Id. at 158 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 732–35, n.23 (1997)).
Id. at 160 (“The State’s interest in respect for life is advanced by the dialogue that better
informs the political and legal systems, the medical profession, expectant mothers, and
society as a whole of the consequences that follow from a decision to elect a late-term
abortion.”).
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The analysis of the effect of the law similarly does not support use
of heightened scrutiny. As explained, the analysis turned on an assessment of the evidence bearing on whether banning the procedure
created a significant health risk. The abortion doctors challenging
the ban had presented evidence suggesting that the intact D & E procedure has some safety advantages: e.g., they testified that the procedure “decreases the risk of cervical laceration or uterine perforation
because it requires fewer passes into the uterus with surgical instruments and does not require the removal of bony fragments of the
dismembered fetus;” and that it “reduces the risks that fetal parts will
222
remain in the uterus.”
However, other doctors had testified, both
in litigation and before Congress, that the standard D & E procedure
223
was “always a safe alternative.” Justice Kennedy noted that the disagreement was reflected in other litigation as well, although the lower
courts had routinely found that the intact D & E procedure had some
224
safety advantages for at least some women in some circumstances.
Justice Kennedy emphasized that the question was “whether the Act
225
can stand when this medical uncertainty persists.”
That is, the issue was framed in terms of whether the law could
survive a facial attack when the challengers’ evidence had cast substantial doubt on the state’s premise or assertion that a safe alternative method was always available. The Court pointed to the traditional principle of giving legislatures “wide discretion” in areas of medical
and scientific uncertainty, noting that this traditional rule is consistent with Casey’s recognition that abortion jurisprudence must accommodate reasonable regulations furthering legitimate state inter226
ests. The opinion explains, in essence, that abortion jurisprudence
should not treat abortion doctors differently than other physicians;
that all physicians are subject to reasonable laws regulating the medi227
cal community.
In support of taking this stance, the opinion cites
precedent and includes parenthetical explanations highlighting (i)
the inappropriateness of abortion jurisprudence that results in courts
serving as “ex officio medical board[s] with powers to approve or disapprove medical and operative practices and standards throughout
222
223
224
225
226
227

Id. at 161.
Id. at 162.
Id.
Id. at 163.
Id.
Id. (“Physicians are not entitled to ignore regulations that direct them to use reasonable
alternative[s] . . . . The law need not give abortion doctors unfettered choice in the
course of their medical practice, nor should it elevate their status above other physicians
in the medical community.”).
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the United States” ; and (ii) the appropriateness of abortion jurisprudence that upholds state regulations relating to medical standards
governing abortion even in the face of arguments that “all health evidence contradicts the claim that there is any health basis for the
229
law.” This discussion does not suggest a role for heightened scrutiny, but instead emphasizes that, even as to state laws with some effect
on access to abortion, courts generally should give substantial deference to legislative choices in the arena of regulations furthering patient health and safety, and should give “wide discretion” if a law regulates in an area of medical uncertainty.
The opinion does thereafter acknowledge that courts retain “an
independent constitutional duty to review factual findings where con230
stitutional rights are at stake.” The acknowledgement was prompted, however, by the Attorney General’s contention that the federal
231
ban should be upheld solely on the basis of congressional findings.
The opinion explains that uncritical deference to legislative fact finding is inappropriate, because sometimes those finding are erroneous—as two of the factual findings were in the case of the federal ban
232
at issue. Again, however, the discussion nowhere suggests the need
for heightened scrutiny or empirical evidence as to the relational inquiry in the Casey analysis. Stating that courts have a duty to review
fact finding where constitutional rights are at stake simply acknowledges that a role exists for judicial assessment of the basis for the
233
challenged law.
Further, the discussion confirms that, in the substantial obstacle
analysis, the burden of proof as to the degree of the burden lies with
the challengers and that deference to state legislative findings can
234
offset evidence of the burden.
In the discussion related to the independent duty to review the basis for the law, Justice Kennedy ex228
229
230
231
232

233

234

Id. at 163–64 (citing Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989)).
Id. at 164 (citing Mazurek, 520 U.S. 968).
Id. at 165.
Id. (citing Brief for Petitioner in No. 05-380, at 23).
Id. at 165–66 (pointing to a finding that no medical schools provide instruction on intact
D & E, and a finding that there exists “a medical consensus” that intact D & E is never
medically necessary).
The case cited in support of the proposition does not direct courts to use a heightened
standard, but, rather, simply instructs courts to review findings of fact made by administrative agencies in agency adjudications when the facts are relevant to constitutional
claims. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
The Court held that the challengers’ evidence was insufficient to show that the law presented an undue burden. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 164. The majority also clarified that, rather than mounting a facial attack, the challengers should have pursued an “as-applied”
challenge. Id. at 167–68.
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plicitly rejected the doctors’ argument that the existence of “substantial medical authority” undermining the government’s position was
235
He rejected the argusufficient to invalidate the challenged law.
ment because use of that standard would allow courts to strike down
legitimate abortion regulations “if some part of the medical commu236
nity were disinclined to follow the proscription.” He instead reiterated: “Considerations of marginal safety, including the balance of
risks, are within the legislative competence when the regulation is ra237
tional and in pursuit of legitimate ends.”
Gonzales therefore does not support heightened review of the basis
for a state abortion law, but, rather, in reality largely confirms the
traditional approach to review of the basis for legislative action: deference to the legislature is appropriate, and even substantial contrary
evidence is not a reason for invalidating a law if some medical or scientific uncertainty exists—as long as the government can articulate
some reasonable connection between the law and a legitimate state
interest. It is therefore not accurate to read Gonzales as employing
more rigorous review of the basis for state laws regulating abortion.
In the analysis of both the purpose and the effect of the law, the majority opinion largely confirms use of traditional rational basis review.
A state remains able to support a law by pointing to a reasonable
connection between the law and the legislature’s objectives, and empirical evidence is not required as even a reasonable inference sufficed in Gonzales.
C. Implicit Signals in Casey
Courts adopting the Balancing Approach have also relied on implicit signals in Casey. The courts in Humble and Strange point to Casey’s application of the undue burden analysis to the spousal notification provision at issue; and the district court in Strange developed two
additional arguments grounded on the use of citations in Justice
O’Connor’s plurality opinion.
1. Analysis of the Spousal Notification Requirement
Both the Ninth Circuit in Humble and the district court in Strange
explained the application of the substantial obstacle analysis in the
Casey opinion in a way that, if valid, would support taking into ac235
236
237

Id. at 166.
Id.
Id.
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238

count the weight of the state’s interest.
Specifically, the courts focused on Casey’s view that the parental notification and consent provisions were permissible, but that the spousal notification provision
was not permissible. Both courts suggest that the Court in Casey distinguished the parental consent law from the spousal notification law
based on the state’s comparatively weaker justification for the spousal
239
notification.
The court in Strange included the following quote
from Casey.
[P]arental-consent] enactments, and our judgment that they are constitutional, are based on the quite reasonable assumption that minors will
benefit from consultation with their parents and that children will often
not realize that their parent have their best interests at heart. We cannot
240
adopt a parallel assumption about adult women.

To the court in Strange, this supported its view that the outcome in
Casey turned on consideration of the extent the provision furthered
the state’s interest.
This reading of Casey is not convincing. Justice O’Connor’s discussion of the spousal notification provision spans eleven and onehalf pages and she nowhere in the analysis discussed the extent to
which the requirement furthers the state interest being promoted by
241
the law. In the first half of the analysis, Justice O’Connor focused
solely on the effect of the law on women—and, in particular, on
women who may be victims of domestic violence and who thus have
242
reasons to fear notifying their spouse. After discussing data of various sorts highlighting the reality of domestic violence, Justice
O’Connor concluded that, for these women, the spousal notification
requirement likely would deter abortions “as surely as if the Com243
monwealth had outlawed abortion in all cases.” That is, the effect
of the provision went to the decision making process itself. She thus
244
concluded that the requirement was an undue burden and invalid.

238

239
240
241
242
243
244

See Humble, 753 F.3d at 913. The Ninth Circuit followed this discussion by noting that the
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786 had adopted a balancing approach.
Id. at 913–17; see also Strange, 9 F. Supp. 3d at 1287 (summary judgment).
See Humble, 753 F.3d at 913 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 895); Strange, 9 F. Supp. 3d at 1287
(summary judgment).
Strange, 9 F. Supp. 3d at 1287 (summary judgment).
See Casey, 505 U.S. at 887–98.
See id. at 887–95.
Id. at 893–94.
Id. at 895. It is in this part of the opinion that Justice O’Connor muddies the waters regarding the proper standard in facial challenges. The state had pointed out that the law
would have that effect in less than one percent of women seeking abortions, and thus that
the law could not be found invalid on its face. Justice O’Connor disagreed, noting that
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Immediately following this conclusion, Justice O’Connor distinguished parental notification or consent requirements, using the language quoted above and relied on by the court in Strange. Because
the entirety of the analysis had focused on the effect on women, the
reasonable implication is that Justice O’Connor meant the statement
to pertain to the effect of the parental notification on access to abortion by minors, and not as relating to the state’s interest. Furthermore, the statement reasonably can be read that way. Consultation
with parents might result in parents agreeing and supporting the minor’s choice to abort a pregnancy. Or, it might result in parents persuading a minor that abortion is not the best choice and supporting
the minor as she carries the child to full term. The point is that the
effect of requiring a minor to consult with parents likely operates to
the benefit and not the detriment of the minor—and in many cases a
minor may not realize the benefits of consultation and fear consultation. In contrast, the effect of the spousal notification requirement
would not so likely operate to the benefit of a woman who does not
want to consult with her spouse.
In the remainder of the discussion of the spousal notification requirement, Justice O’Connor elaborated on the mother’s liberty interest (seemingly to bolster her view that the effect of the law struck
at the essence of the woman’s interest—the right to make the deci245
sion itself).
The application of the undue burden analysis to the
spousal notification requirement therefore does not support the Balancing Approach.
2. Citations
To bolster its characterization of Casey as establishing the Balancing Approach, the court in Strange developed arguments grounded in
citations used by Justice O’Connor: specifically, a citation to ballot-

245

“in a large fraction of the cases in which [the law] is relevant, it will operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman’s choice to undergo an abortion.” Id.
Id. at 895–98. In particular, Justice O’Connor presents several reasons why—as to state
regulations relating to a child prior to birth—a mother’s liberty interest outweighs the father’s interest in the welfare of the child. She agreed that, as to a child after its birth who
is being raised by both parents, the father’s interest and the mother’s interest are equal.
Id. at 895–96. But she concluded that the “Constitution does not permit a State to require a married woman to obtain her husband’s consent before undergoing an abortion.”
Id. at 897. Much of her reasoning relates to women in situations of domestic violence,
but she also based her conclusion on concerns that a spousal notification requirement
would give a husband a “troubling degree of authority over his wife”—and would resurrect outdated conceptions of marriage and the nature of women’s rights. Id. at 897–98.
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access box cases and a citation to Doe v. Bolton,
to Roe v. Wade. Neither argument is persuasive.
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the companion case

(a) The Ballot-Access Cases
In Casey, after rejecting Roe’s trimester framework but before introducing the undue burden standard, Justice O’Connor stated:
As our jurisprudence relating to all liberties save perhaps abortion has
recognized, not every law which makes a right more difficult to exercise
is, ipso facto, an infringement of that right. [For example, we] have held
that not every ballot access limitation amounts to an infringement of the
right to vote. Rather, the States are granted substantial flexibility in establishing the framework within which voters choose the candidates for
247
whom they wish to vote.

She followed the statement with a citation to two cases: Anderson v.
248
The court in Strange decided that the
Celebrezze and Norman v. Reed.
citation was intended to support “more than just the narrow point
249
that not every regulation of abortion is unconstitutional.”
Rather,
the court construed the citation as indicating that these particular
cases reflected the type of analysis Justice O’Connor intended to be
250
established through the adoption of the undue burden analysis.
As interpreted by the court in Strange, Anderson, and Norman reflect an analysis that asks a court to weigh both the obstacles abortion
regulations create for women seeking abortions and the nature and
251
strength of the state’s justification for the laws. That is, in applying
the undue burden analysis, “the ‘character and magnitude of the asserted injury,’ affects whether the ‘corresponding interest [is] suffi252
ciently weighty to justify the limitation.’” To the court, assessing the
relationship between the obstacle and the state justification is the
“heart of the test”: in short, the test is whether the obstacles imposed
253
are greater than is warranted by the state’s justification.
This argument suffers from significant shortcomings. As an initial
matter, the analysis in the Anderson and Norman cases—as interpreted
by the court in Strange—is not the analysis described by Justice
O’Connor and applied to the state laws in Casey. As detailed, the
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253

Bolton, 410 U.S. 179.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 873–74 (1992).
Id. at 874 (citing Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279 (1992); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S.
780 (1983)).
Strange, 9 F. Supp. 3d at 1284 (summary judgment).
Id. at 1283–84 (quoting Norman, 502 U.S. at 288–89; Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789).
Id. at 1280 & 1283–84 (citing Norman, 502 U.S. 279; Anderson, 460 U.S. 780).
Id. at 1284 (citing Norman, 502 U.S. at 288–89; Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789).
Id. at 1287.
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analysis developed by Justice O’Connor in Casey does not include a
balancing inquiry and readily accommodates state laws furthering legitimate state interests (i.e., laws with a valid purpose), as long as the
effect of the laws does not place a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman’s freedom to decide to terminate a pregnancy. There is no
reason to give more importance to Justice O’Connor’s use of a citation than to the text of the opinion itself.
Moreover, a careful reading of the Anderson and Norman cases reveals several reasons why the Strange court is wrong to claim that the
254
cases are the “key” to understanding the undue burden analysis.
First, the rights at issue in the cases are different than in the abortion
context. The rights at issue in Anderson and Norman were the right of
politicians or political parties to get onto state ballots and corre255
sponding rights of voters. The Court in Anderson explained that the
impact of candidate eligibility requirements on voters implicates both
the right of qualified voters to cast votes effectively and the right of
association to advance political beliefs—rights that the Court readily
characterized as fundamental, and as rights “among our most pre256
cious.” In contrast, although Justice O’Connor in Casey described a
257
woman’s interests relating to abortion in rather sweeping terms,
seven Justices in Casey declined to characterize the right at stake as
fundamental, and Justice O’Connor characterized the right only as
“some freedom” to terminate a pregnancy previability (and thereafter
258
if necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother): a freedom
arising because of the personal nature of the decision, and its rela259
tion to personal dignity and autonomy, but a nonetheless limited
freedom because abortion “is an act fraught with consequences for
260
others.”

254
255

256
257
258

259
260

Cf. id. at 1284–85 (explaining how Casey’s rejection of tiers of scrutiny, a concept stated in
Anderson and Norman, is the focus of the undue burden analysis).
See Norman, 502 U.S. at 282 (affirming in part and reversing in part a decision of the Illinois Supreme Court to bar candidates from running under a political party label in an
election); Anderson, 460 U.S. at 786–87 (explaining how candidate eligibility requirements
affect the rights of voters).
Anderson, 460 U.S. at 787–88, n.7 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30–31
(1968)).
See Casey, 505 U.S. at 851–52 (describing abortion rights as those that are central to human dignity and autonomy).
See id. at 869, 879 (explaining how women have a constitutional freedom to terminate
their pregnancy, holding that a state cannot outlaw a woman from terminating her pregnancy before viability).
See id. at 851–53 (explaining how an abortion decision is central to personal dignity and
autonomy).
Id. at 852.
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Second, although the Court in Anderson used the language quoted
in Strange in describing the analysis used for assessing the constitu261
tionality of state regulations infringing on the rights at issue, the
Court’s application of the analysis in Anderson strongly resembles the
second prong of strict scrutiny: the restrictions were invalidated be262
cause they were “not necessary,” were not the “best means to the
263
264
end,” were not “essential,” were not “precisely drawn,” and because a “less drastic” way of furthering its legitimate interests was
265
available. This aspect of the analysis was confirmed when the Court
in Norman explained the analysis as follows:
To the degree that a State would thwart [the] interest by limiting the access of new parties to the ballot, we have called for the demonstration of
a corresponding interest sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation, (citations omitted), and we have accordingly required any severe restriction
to be narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling im266
portance.

Because Norman was decided just five months prior to Casey, it is reasonable to assume that Justice O’Connor was aware that the ballotaccess cases mirrored to a considerable extent strict scrutiny analysis.
Yet in Casey, Justice O’Connor and six other Justices explicitly rejected use of a strict scrutiny approach.
Moreover, in reality, the undue burden analysis as described and
applied in Casey resembles not the analysis described and used by the
majority in Anderson, but, rather, resembles somewhat the analysis described by the dissenting Justices in Anderson—which included Justice
O’Connor. The dissenting Justices in Anderson chided the majority
for missing the point that, in cases like the one at hand,
we have never required that States meet some kind of “narrowly tailored”
standard in order to pass constitutional muster. [Rather,] we have said
before that a court’s job is to ensure that the State “in no way freezes the
status quo, but implicitly recognizes the potential fluidity of American
political life.” (Citations omitted.) If it does not freeze the status quo,
261
262
263

264
265

266

Strange, 9 F. Supp. 3d at 1284 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789) (summary judgment).
See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 797, 800 (explaining how the measure at issue was not necessary
to the efficient operation of elections).
See id. at 798 (quoting Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 770 (1976)) (disparaging Ohio’s ballot notification measure as one that impermissibly closes communication to the public).
See id. at 803 (citing Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 733 (1974) (describing how a ballot
measure that was deemed essential in prior case was constitutional)).
See id. at 806 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963); Kusper v. Pontikes,
414 U.S. 51, 58–59 (1973)) (showing how when our most precious freedoms, such as the
right to vote, are regulated, the reglulations must be precise and necessary to satisfying
the applicable state interest).
Norman, 502 U.S. at 288–89.
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then the State’s laws will be upheld if they are “tied to a particularized le267
gitimate purpose, and [are] in no sense invidious or arbitrary.”

This analysis has obvious parallels to the analysis in Casey. It seeks to
accommodate state laws designed to further legitimate state interests,
up to the point at which a state infringement goes too far: when the
law “freezes the status quo.” The analysis also is much closer to the
sentiment expressed in the sentence in Casey to which the citation to
Anderson and Norman is attached—wherein Justice O’Connor said
that, in the arena of ballot access limitations, “the States are granted
substantial flexibility in establishing the framework within which vot268
ers choose the candidates for whom they wish to vote.” Thus, if one
wants to read the use of Justice O’Connor’s citation to the Anderson
and Norman cases as an implicit signal as to the “key” to the undue
burden standard, it seems considerably more likely that Justice
O’Connor was thinking of the analysis she agreed with in Anderson.
This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that Justice O’Connor listed
Anderson first in the citation, even though Norman ordinarily would be
listed first since it is the more recent decision. Thus the theory that
the citation to Anderson and Norman supports use of the Balancing
Approach simply does not withstand scrutiny.
(b) Bolton v. Doe
In the opinion issued following the trial, the court in Strange included one additional argument supporting its adoption of the balancing approach. Specifically, the court found Doe v. Bolton to be
particularly instructive to the issue of the proper application of the
269
substantial obstacle analysis. The court explained that Bolton involved, in part, a challenge to a law requiring abortions to be performed in a hospital setting and that, in Casey, the plurality cited Bol270
ton approvingly. According to the court in Strange, the Supreme
Court struck down the law in Bolton, finding that the challengers’ evidence showed that alternative clinic settings with appropriate staff
and facilities were “entirely adequate to perform abortions” and that
the state’s evidence did not show that the law was necessary to its in271
terest in health and safety. The court noted: “despite acknowledg-

267
268
269
270
271

Anderson, 460 U.S. at 817 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Rosario v. Rockefeller,
410 U.S. 752, 762 (1973)).
Casey, 505 U.S. at 873–74.
Strange, 3 F. Supp. 3d. at 1339 (citing Doe, 410 U.S. 179) (post-trial motion).
Id. (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 874–75).
Id. at 1340 (quoting Doe, 410 U.S. at 195).
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ing the State’s legitimate interest in protecting women’s health, the
Court [in Bolton] carefully considered the evidence on the degree to
which the hospital regulation would actually advance that interest;”
the Court “required the State to establish, through evidence, that the
272
regulation really was strongly justified.”
The court in Strange thus
concluded: “This approach . . . laid a foundation for the analysis
273
mandated by Casey and articulated by this court.”
This theory also fails to withstand scrutiny. Foremost, careful
reading of the Casey opinion shows that Justice O’Connor cited to Bolton as part of the discussion relating to rejection of the trimester
framework set out in Roe. In the Casey opinion, she first confirmed
the “essential aspect of Roe” (that a woman has some freedom to
274
terminate her pregnancy prior to viability); emphasized that the
right has never been absolute, given the many consequences impact275
ing others; and explained one aspect of the flawed trimester frame276
work (that it overvalues the pregnant woman’s interest). She then
explained that abortion jurisprudence should focus instead on
whether the challenged state law impacting freedom to abort imposes
277
an undue burden on a woman’s ability to make the decision. She
stated: “For the most part, the Court’s early abortion cases adhered
to this view,” and the citation to Bolton follows (along with other cas278
es).
Justice O’Connor continued the discussion by explaining another aspect of the flawed trimester framework: that it undervalues
279
The key point she was making is that the unthe state’s interests.
due burden analysis will strike a more appropriate balance because
280
“not all regulations must be deemed unwarranted.” The citation to
Bolton is thus in the middle of that portion of the opinion where Justice O’Connor is making the case for shifting away from the trimester
framework to an “undue burden analysis.”
It therefore is not convincing to assert that the citation was intended to signal anything about the proper application of the undue

272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280

Id. at 1340–41.
Id.
See Casey, 505 U.S. at 869–70 (explaining a woman has some freedom to end her pregnancy).
See id. at 871, 852 (classifying abortion as a unique act that has consequences for others).
See id. at 872–73 (declaring the trimester approach to misunderstand the pregnant woman’s interest).
See id. at 873–76 (holding the Due Process Clause only invalidates abortion regulations
when they pose an undue burden on a woman’s decision to have an abortion).
Id. at 874–75.
Id. at 875.
Id. at 876.
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burden analysis. Justice O’Connor did not begin discussing how the
analysis should be applied until after she had made the case for
adopting the analysis. Stated another way, it is immediately after
making the case for adopting the analysis that she began a description of how the analysis should be applied by explaining: “A finding
of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state
regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle
281
in the path of a woman seeking an abortion.” It simply isn’t plausible, then, to assert that the citation to Bolton has bearing on how to
apply to substantial obstacle analysis.
Further, the court in Strange has attempted to use the citation to
Bolton as support for substantially diluting the substantial obstacle
analysis. The court emphasized that, in Bolton, the Court’s analysis
hinged on scrutiny of the evidence for a showing by the state of the
degree to which the challenged state furthered a legitimate state interest; that the Court “required the State to establish, through evi282
dence, that the regulation really was strongly justified.” This tactic
283
(which also reflects a misreading of Bolton) represents a misunderstanding of Casey. Seven Justices in Casey were seeking to modify
abortion jurisprudence to better accommodate state laws furthering
legitimate state interests. Nothing in Casey or Gonzales emphasizes the

281
282
283

Id. at 877.
See Planned Parenthood Se., Inc. v. Strange, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1330, 1341 (M.D. Ala.), as
corrected (Oct. 24, 2014) (post-trial motion).
Several aspects of the Strange court’s description of Bolton are erroneous. First, the Court
in Bolton invalidated the provision requiring that abortions be performed in a hospital
because it failed to exclude abortions performed in the first trimester. Bolton, 410 U.S. at
195. The other discussion related to evidence was dicta only. See id. at 194–95 (beginning
the paragraph as follows: “This is not to say that Georgia may not or should not, from
and after the end of the first trimester, adopt standards for licensing all facilities where
abortions may be performed so long as those standards are legitimately related to the objective the State seeks to accomplish.”). Second, the analysis in Bolton as to the three challenged provisions focused almost exclusively on one simple issue: whether the provisions
furthered state interests. See id. at 193 (noting that JCAH accreditation had “no present
particularized concern with abortion as a medical or surgical procedure”); id. at 197–98
(noting that the committee approval requirement would not further a state interest in
potential life because a physician would have already made a “medical judgment,” nor
necessary to protect hospitals and thus “serves neither the hospital nor the State); id. at
199 (noting that the two-physician concurrence “has no rational connection” to maternal
health given that a woman’s physician must make the same decision). Nothing in the
analysis suggests a balancing approach hinging on the weight of the state interests versus
the extent of the burden on a women’s freedom to abort. Third, the analysis does not
support use of any heightened scrutiny when assessing whether the law furthers state interests. As to each provision, the Court simply found no connection between the provision and the state interests. Id. at 195, 217, 220.
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need for a state to prove with evidence the degree to which a state law
will be successful in fulfilling the state’s legitimate interest.
V. APPROPRIATE REFINEMENTS TO THE CASEY ANALYSIS AND OTHER
CONSIDERATIONS
The many distinct analyses in this article highlight several important points relating to refinements to the Casey analysis. Foremost, none of the rationales developed by the courts embracing the
Balancing Approach are persuasive. In short, nothing in Casey or
Gonzales legitimately supports analyzing laws designed to advance
state interests in health and safety differently from laws advancing
other legitimate state interests; or engaging in an evidentiary assessment of the extent to which an abortion law promotes legitimate state
interests and in-turn using the result of that assessment to lower the
standard used in deciding whether a law presents a substantial obstacle. What Casey and Gonzales do support is an analysis that genuinely
respects and better accommodates state laws furthering legitimate
state interests—while recognizing that constitutional principles allow
women some freedom to terminate a pregnancy. In working out the
standard to be used to decide whether a law impacting ready access to
abortion should be upheld or invalidated, it must be remembered
that, although three Justices settled on the substantial obstacle standard, four other Justices opined that the substantial obstacle standard
was too high. Thus any refinement that dilutes the standard is at
odds with the majority view in Casey.
Similarly, any refinement that introduces heightened review of the
legislative basis for the law or requires “narrowly tailored” laws is at
odds with Casey and Gonzales. Seven Justices in Casey rejected use of
strict scrutiny in the context of abortion regulation. Further, none of
these seven Justices were in favor of lesser forms of heightened scrutiny: the opinions are devoid of any language requiring or suggesting
that, to be permissible, state laws must be “substantially related to sufficiently important state interests,” or “substantially related to legiti284
mate state interests.” Rather, Justice O’Connor and the four Justices favoring only rational basis review spoke only in terms of state laws
reasonably related to legitimate state interests. The Gonzales decision
readily confirmed that approach.

284

See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440–42 (1985) (explaining various forms of heightened scrutiny).
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Moreover, there is no reason for heightened scrutiny in the context of legislation relating to abortion. Heightened scrutiny of the
legislative basis for a law was developed to protect constitutional
rights deemed fundamental, or to protect against legislative classifications based on factors that ordinarily are not relevant, such as race,
alienage, national origin, gender, or illegitimacy—classifications that
285
therefore very likely reflect “prejudice and antipathy.” In these situations, the general rule that legislation is presumed valid falls away,
opening the door to judicial scrutiny of the appropriateness of the
law. Casey points away from heightened scrutiny in the abortion context. Seven Justices in Casey expressly backed away from Roe’s vision
of a fundamental right to terminate a pregnancy. Seven Justices in
Casey also recognized and acknowledged that state regulation relating
to abortion is not “very likely” driven by prejudice and antipathy, but,
rather, is driven by a variety of legitimate state interests that must be
respected given that a decision to abort a pregnancy is an act “fraught
286
with consequences for others.” There is thus no reason to deviate
from the standard paradigm of judicial restraint. As recognized by
the Fifth Circuit in Abbott II in rejecting the Balancing Approach, this
287
“rule of restraint” respects the legislative process. The Casey analysis, as modeled by the Court in Casey and Gonzales, allows courts to
guard against prejudice and antipathy by ensuring that a challenged
law relating to abortion furthers—i.e., is reasonably related to—
legitimate state interests. If so, the analysis requires courts to uphold
the law unless the effect of the law rises to the level of a substantial
obstacle. The inclusion of the substantial obstacle element is the
means by which Justice O’Connor raised the undue burden analysis
beyond mere rational basis review.
285
286
287

Id.; see also Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 313–15 (noting that judicial intervention may be
necessary where an inference of antipathy exists).
Casey, 505 U.S. at 852.
See supra notes 108–09 and accompanying text. As the Supreme Court has explained:
The Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process and that
judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may
think a political branch has acted. . . .
[T]hose attacking the rationality of the [law] have the burden “to negative every
conceivable basis which might support it,” . . . . Moreover, because we never require a legislature to articulate its reasons for enacting a statute, it is entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason for the challenged
[law] actually motivated the legislature. . . . [A] legislative choice is not subject to
courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by
evidence or empirical data. ‘Only by faithful adherence to this guiding principle
of judicial review of legislation is it possible to preserve to the legislative branch its
rightful independence and its ability to function.’
Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 314–15. (citations omitted).
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Importantly, however, study of Casey and Gonzales also suggests
that the traditional or standard articulation of (or approach to) the
Casey analysis reflected in lower court decisions should be modified.
Lower courts applying the Casey analysis have tended to view it as consisting of two steps, articulated as follows: the analysis requires, first,
an assessment of the basis for the law; and, second, an assessment of
whether the law imposes an undue burden—i.e., whether the purpose or effect of the law places a substantial obstacle in the path of a
288
woman seeking an abortion. The Gonzales decision clarifies a useful
refinement to this vision of the Casey analysis—a refinement that
merges the relational inquiry in what lower courts consider as stepone of the Casey analysis, with the purpose inquiry in step-two.
In Gonzales, the Court did not conduct what lower courts would
consider a “step-one” analysis. Rather the decision hinged on the
question whether the purpose or effect of the federal ban was to
place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking a
289
previability abortion (Part IV). The analysis of the purpose of the
law turned on whether the law furthered a legitimate government in290
terest (Part IV(A)).
As discussed, using a deferential approach to
the question and in part based on reasonable inferences, the Court
291
Based on
found that the ban furthered legitimate state interests.
that finding, the Court rejected the challenger’s claim that the congressional purpose of the Act was to “place a substantial obstacle in
292
the path of a woman seeking an abortion.” Under this approach, a
finding that a law furthers a legitimate state interest suffices to take
purpose out of the substantial obstacle inquiry, or, stated another
way, streamlines the substantial obstacle analysis by allowing a court
293
to focus only on the effect of the law.

288

289
290
291
292
293

As to the first step in the analysis the key disagreement between courts adopting and
courts rejecting the Balancing Approach has been whether to use a traditional rational
basis inquiry (as emphasized by the Fifth Circuit) or to require empirical evidence of the
extent to which the challenged law furthered state interests (as endorsed by Judge Posner). As explained, the Gonzales decision does not support requiring states to prove with
empirical evidence that a challenged abortion law furthers state interests, and confirms
appropriateness of resort to traditional rational basis review.
Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 156–67.
Id. at 156–60.
Id.; see also supra Part III(B)(2).
Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 160.
But see June Med. Servs., LLC v. Kliebert, No. 14-525-JWD-RLB, 2015 WL 2239877, at *12–
13 (M.D. La. May 12, 2015) (declining to adopt the argument offered by the Louisiana
Department of Health and Hospitals that circuit precedent finding that the challenged
abortion regulation furthers a legitimate state interest took the “purpose” inquiry off the
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This way of understanding the Casey analysis is fully consistent with
Justice O’Connor’s explanation of the undue burden analysis. Justice
O’Connor explained in Casey that “[a] finding of an undue burden is
a shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
294
seeking an abortion of a non-viable fetus.” Yet, as Justice O’Connor
continued to provide guidance regarding the analysis, she focused on
the idea that permissible laws regulating abortion must have a valid
purpose or further state interests: laws designed to serve legitimate
interests (laws designed to further the interest in human life, or laws
designed to foster the health or safety of a woman seeking an abortion) “will be upheld if reasonably related” to the legitimate interest—but only if “they are not a substantial obstacle to the woman’s
295
exercise of the right to choose.” By way of example, she explained
that a state law “designed to persuade [a woman] to choose childbirth over abortion will be upheld if reasonably related to that goal”
—“[u]nless it has the effect [of a substantial obstacle] on her right of
296
choice.” It also is fully consistent with the important role of the relational inquiry: that of guarding against prejudice and antipathy by
ensuring that a challenged law relating to abortion furthers legitimate state interests. Accordingly, the better way of articulating the
Casey analysis is as follows:
The analysis consists of an inquiry into purpose and effect: (1) a relational inquiry focusing on the purpose of the law, namely, whether the law
is reasonably related to a legitimate state interest (e.g., the life of the unborn child, the health and safety of the mother or unborn child, the integrity of the medical profession, education of the community, etc.); and
(2) an inquiry focusing on whether the effect of the law is to place a sub297
stantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking a previability abortion.

This formulation of the analysis retains a two-step approach, but each
step is focused on a distinct inquiry: the purpose or legislative basis
of the law in one step, and the effect of the law in the other.

294
295
296

297

table, for the reason that the circuit court of appeals approached the analysis in the traditional two-stepped way ).
Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
Id. at 877–78.
Id. at 878 (emphasis added). She also reiterated the flip side of the equation: even a law
reasonably related to a legitimate state interest is impermissible if the law imposes a substantial obstacle on a woman’s decision to abort previability. Id. at 877 (“[W]e answer the
question, left open in previous opinions discussing the undue burden formulation,
whether a law designed to further the State’s interest in fetal life which imposes an undue
burden on the woman’s decision before fetal viability could be constitutional. The answer is no.” (citation omitted)).
See supra note 31 and accompanying text (describing the Casey analysis in this way).
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This refinement also makes clear that the analysis does not depend on the nature of the state interests being advanced by the challenged state law and, importantly, preserves the concept of substantial obstacle as a meaningful standard for assessing the
constitutionality of abortion restrictions. The district court in Strange
had defended the Balancing Approach in part precisely because it
undermined the substantial obstacle standard. The court explained:
If the severity of the burdens imposed has nothing to do with the
strength of the reasons for those burdens, then courts are left to articulate a one-size-fits-all definition of “substantial obstacle” applicable regardless of the weight of the governmental interests at stake.
This approach is hopelessly unworkable. If the one-size-fits-all level of
“substantial obstacle” is set too low, then courts will be instructed to strike
down regulations even in the face of compelling health consequences, an
outcome no one desires. If, on the other hand, the one-size-fits-all level
of “substantial obstacle” is set too high, then essentially all abortion regulation would be permitted, no matter how severe the burdens and how
298
slight the governmental interests.

The court in Strange is right that setting the standard at the wrong
point would be problematic. Indeed that was the whole point of the
shift in abortion jurisprudence in Casey. Roe and its progeny had set
the bar too high: requiring that challenged laws survive strict scrutiny
(i.e., the laws must have been narrowly tailored and designed to advance compelling state interests), and miscalculating the point at
which state interests would become compelling. Justice O’Connor
adjusted the standard to better accommodate state laws furthering
legitimate state interests.
But that the substantial obstacle standard remains to be applied
on a case-by-case basis does not render it unworkable. Justice
O’Connor intended the standard to be definite and meaningful. She
believed that courts could identify the appropriate point at which a
burden would infringe too greatly on a woman’s limited freedom to
decide to abort. In her vision, that point would be consistent with the
name she selected “substantial”; and thus not merely “slight” as it
could be in a case using the Balancing Approach. Preserving the
standard as envisioned by Justice O’Connor is central to maintaining
the overarching objective in Casey—modifying abortion jurisprudence to better accommodate state regulation of abortion furthering
legitimate state interests.
In reality, the emerging use of the Balancing Approach largely reflects judges attempting to give effect to their subjective views that re298

Strange, 9 F. Supp. 3d at 1293 (summary judgment).
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cent state legislative initiatives should not be permitted because the
effect of the laws—although not “substantial”—warrants invalidation.
The laws at issue impact the ease with which abortion providers such
as Planned Parenthood can maintain and set up abortion clinics. In
enacting admitting privileges laws or laws establishing higher standards for facilities where abortions are carried out—or laws aimed at
ensuring that woman have appropriate guidance and assistance,
whether for surgical or medication induced abortions—state legislatures are acting primarily to prevent the potential for substandard
care in the context of abortion. This concern is reasonable in light of
known instances of substandard care (see Appendix), and reasonable
299
even if instances of substandard care are somewhat rare.
Planned
Parenthood and other abortion providers are claiming a purported
300
inability to comply and pointing to clinic closures.
The judges
adopting the Balancing Approach primarily have been concerned
about the potential that some woman will face greater practical difficulties accessing abortion services, and the Balancing Approach has
simply been the vehicle allowing them to find that those difficulties
render the laws unconstitutional—despite being analogous to effects
the Court in Casey signaled as falling short of a substantial obstacle.
Additionally, in adopting the Balancing Approach the courts have
side-stepped two important and distinct issues. The first issue is
whether practical difficulties such as increases in travel distances and
299

300

Judge Manion, in a concurring opinion in Van Hollen explained that, in defending the
admitting privileges law, Wisconsin presented to the court numerous examples of egregious conditions and practices at some abortion clinics, emphasizing in particular the
practices of Dr. Kermit Gosnell, which garnered national attention and shock just a few
weeks prior to the enactment of the Wisconsin law. See Van Hollen, 738 F.3d at 802–03
(Manion, J., concurring) (noting that the Gosnell situation revealed use of unlicensed
employees to conduct gynecological examinations and administer drugs, resulting in the
death of a patient; instances of physical assault and forced abortion on a minor; leaving
fetal remains in a woman’s uterus causing excruciating pain; and unclean and bloody facilities). Judge Manion appended to the opinion a list of the examples of egregious and
substandard care by abortion providers that Wisconsin had presented to the court. Id. at
807–10. Judge Manion’s Appendix is included as an appendix to this Article.
The legitimacy of the claims is suspect, of course, given that Planned Parenthood regularly reports annual income in the billions. For example, for the fiscal year ending June 30,
2014, Planned Parenthood reported an overall income of $1.3 billion. See Planned
Parenthood Federation of America, 2013–2014 Annual Report: Our Health. Our Decisions.
Our Moment., at 19–22, (2014), http://www.plannedparenthood.org/files/6714/1996/
2641/2013-2014_Annual_Report_FINAL_WEB_VERSION.pdf.
Further,
Planned
Parenthood has recently opened a number of “mega” abortion facilities. See, e.g., Randal
K. O’Bannon, Abortion Clinic Closings in Texas—What do they really mean? (Mar. 14, 2014),
http://www.nationalrighttolifenews.org/news/2014/03/abortion-clinic-closings-in-texaswhat-do-they-really-mean/#.VNEzxC79x7Y (reporting that Planned Parenthood had
opened up more than a dozen giant mega-centers between 2010 and 2014).
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associated costs can ever rise to level of a substantial obstacle—which
turns on the nature of the woman’s interest protected by the undue
burden analysis. Is it a liberty interest in being able to legally make
the ultimate decision to terminate a pregnancy previability; or an interest that, in essence, requires states to facilitate abortion through a
regulatory scheme that ensures ready and easy access to abortion
providers. The second issue is whether it is reasonable to view the
laws as causing the difficulties—as opposed to other factors, such as
hospital-based decisions to deny staff privileges, or the meager number of physicians willing to perform abortions. These issues warrant
analysis beyond the scope of this Article, and laws furthering legitimate state interests that indirectly result in practical difficulties in accessing abortion services should not be invalidated absent that careful
analysis.
Lastly, another point is worthy of consideration. In large part the
courts adopting the Balancing Approach have been reacting to the
closure of some abortion clinics. Yet it is reasonable to view those
closures as an effect that is due, in reality, to the preclusion of abortion-related regulation in the decades following Roe. That is, the preclusion of abortion regulation allowed Planned Parenthood and other abortion providers to set up clinics and offer abortion services with
virtually no regulatory oversight. If the Court in Roe had exercised
more restraint and allowed states room to strike the right balance legislatively—the balance between a woman’s liberty interest in terminating a pregnancy and legitimate state interests—states may well have
enacted the regulations now emerging in the immediate aftermath of
Roe. If so, a possible consequence might have been fewer abortion
clinics than the number that emerged under Roe’s analytical framework. If so, it would have been difficult to characterize the state regulations as presenting a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion. Rather, the very same regulations would have
been part and parcel of the process for allowing women legal access
to abortion.
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APPENDIX
List of Evidence of Substandard Abortion Care or Practices,
PREPARED BY JUDGE MANION IN VAN HOLLEN
APPENDIX TO THE CONCURRENCE
Dr. Soleiman Soli in Pennsylvania. See Mark Scolforo, Two Abortion
Clinics Closed After Reports, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, Mar. 10, 2011,
http://www. washingtontimes.com/news/2011/mar/10/2–abortion–
clinics–closedafter–reports/ (two abortion clinics shut down when inspection revealed expired drugs, uncalibrated medical equipment,
and untrained personnel; a network of abortion care providers described the clinics as “women exploiters”).
Dr. Andrew Rutland in California. See C. Perkes, Abortion Doctor
Gives Up License Over Death, ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, Jan. 25, 2011,
http://www.ocregister.com/articles/rutland–285561–death–
license.html (woman died where clinic “was not equipped to handle
emergencies” and the abortion doctor “failed to recognize [an allergic] reaction, adequately attempt resuscitation or promptly call 911.”
The doctor had previously given up his license “after allegations
of . . . scaring patients into unnecessary hysterectomies, botching surgeries, lying to patients, falsifying medical records, over-prescribing
painkillers and having sex with a patient in his office.”).
Dr. Albert Dworkin in Delaware. See Steven Ertelt, Hearing: Delaware Abortionist Helped Kermit Gosnell Avoid Law, LIFENEWS, Mar. 16,
2011,
http://www.lifenews.com/2011/03/16/hearing-delawareabortionist-helpedkermit-gosnell-avoid-law/ (doctor complicit in
Kermit Gosnell’s violations has license suspended).
Dr. James Pendergraft in Florida. See Steven Ertelt, Abortion Practitioner James Pendergraft Loses Florida License a Fourth Time, LIFENEWS,
Jan.
1,
2009,
http://www.lifenews.com/2009/01/01/state–
5339/(abortion doctor’s license suspended for fourth time for entrusting drug administration to unlicensed employee, previous suspensions included a botched abortion that resulted in the unborn
child being shoved into the abdominal cavity and requiring that the
woman receive a hysterectomy).
The Gentilly Medical Clinic for Women and the Hope Medical
Group for Women in Louisiana. See Steven Ertelt, Abortion Business in
Louisiana Loses License for Poor Health, Safety Standards, LIFENEWS, Jan.
20, 2010, http://www. lifenews.com/ 2010/01/20/state–4743/ (clin-
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ic lost license for operating without trained nurse or proper drug license); P.J. Smith, Louisiana Abortion Clinic Shut Down for Ignoring
“Most Basic” Medical Practices, LIFENEWS, Sep. 7, 2011, http://www.
lifesitenews.com/news/archive/ldn/2010/sep/10090707
(clinic’s
operations suspended for failing to observe “the most basic medical
practices” including “provid[ing] women a physical examination prior to abortions” or “follow[ing] necessary protocols for the administration of anesthesia and monitoring their clients’ vital signs”).
Drs. Romeo Ferrer, George Shepard, Leroy Carhart, and Nicola
Riley in Maryland. See, respectively, Steven Ertelt, Pro–Lifers Want Maryland Practitioner Disciplined, Killed Woman in Botched Abortion,
LIFENEWS, June 1, 2010, http://www.lifenews.com/2010/06/01/
state–5145/ (“Board of Physician’s Peer Reviewers concluded the
woman’s death resulted from Ferrer’s failure to meet the standard of
quality care in violation of state law.”); Steven Ertelt, Troubled Abortion Biz Sees Two Practitioners Lose Medical Licenses, LIFENEWS,
Sept. 3, 2010, http://www.lifenews.com/2010/09/03/state–5416/
(transfer of patient of botched abortion in a rental car to a clinic in
another state leads to the discovery, and suspension, of two doctors
circumventing state law); Authorities: Woman Died from Abortion
Complications, USA TODAY, June 12, 2013, http:// www.usatoday.
com/story/news/nation/2013/02/21/woman-late-term-abortionbled-todeath/1935799/ (Dr. Carhart is under investigation for the
death of Jennifer Morbelli, a 29 year-old school teacher who underwent a late-term abortion); The order is available at
http://abortiondocs.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Nicola–
Riley–MD–Permanent–Revocation–May–6–2013.pdf (order permanently revoking Dr. Nicola Riley’s medical license Maryland after she
failed to call for emergency help for a critically injured abortion patient and transported her to the hospital in the backseat of a rental
car).
Dr. Steven Brigham in Maryland, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania.
See N.J. Targets Abortion Doctor Steven Brigham’s License, LEHIGH VALLEY
LIVE, Sept. 9, 2010, http://www.lehighvalleylive.com/phillip-burg/
index.ssf/2010/09/nj_targets_abortion_doctor_ste.html (New Jersey
seeks to take doctor’s license after Maryland already took his license
for risky interstate abortion scheme).
Dr. Rapin Osathanondh in Massachusetts. See Denise Lavoie, Doctor Gets 6 Months in Abortion Patient Death, MSNBC, Sep. 14, 2010,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/39177186/ns/us_news-crime_and_
courts/t/doctor-gets-months-abortion-patientdeath/ (doctor sentenced to six months in jail for involuntary manslaughter because “he
failed to monitor [abortion patient] while she was under anesthesia,
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delayed calling emergency services when her heart stopped, and later
lied to try to cover up his actions.”).
Dr. Alberto Hodari in Michigan. See Schuette Files Suit to Close Unlicensed Abortion Clinic, Office of the Attorney General, State of Michigan, Mar. 29, 2011, http://www.michigan.gov/ag/0,4534,7–164–
253426—,00.html (Michigan Attorney General sues to close abortion
clinic for failing to comply with health and safety rules applicable to
surgical outpatient facilities).
Drs. Salomon Epstein and Robert Hosty in New York. See Steven
Ertelt, Practitioner Denies He Botched Legal Abortion That Killed Hispanic
Woman, LIFENEWS, Mar. 1, 2010, http://www.lifenews.com/2010/03/
01/state–4858/ (New York police investigate doctor after 37–year–old
patient dies in botched abortion); http://operationrescue.org/pdfs/
Hosty%20revocation.pdf (eventually, responsibility for the death Dr.
Epstein was investigated for was attributed to another doctor at the
clinic, Dr. Hosty, whose license was revoked in this order); Southwestern Women’ Options in New Mexico, see Jeremy Kryn, New 911
Call from New Mexico Abortion Clinic Exposes Pattern of Emergencies,
LIFENEWS, Oct. 20, 2011, http://www.lifesitenews.com/news/new–
911–call–from–new–mexico-abortion-clinic-exposes-pattern-ofemergencies (“A recording of a 911 call . . . highlights the continuing
danger [at] an Albuquerque abortion clinic. . . . The call is the eleventh emergency call [from the clinic] in less than two years. . . .” it
was transcribed as follows, “‘Uh, we have a 31–year–old female who
underwent an abortion today. She’s continuing to bleed. We need
to transfer her to the hospital, please . . . . The bleeding is persistent.
It will not stop.’”).
Dr. Tami Lynn Holst Thorndike in North Dakota. See Denise
Burke, North Dakota Abortionist Practices With Expired License,
AMERICANS UNITED FOR LIFE, Nov. 8, 2010, http://www.aul.org/
2010/11/north-dakota-abortionist-practices-with-expiredlicense/
(“[A] North Dakota abortionist is being investigated for practicing
with an expired license.”).
Drs. Robert E. Hanson Jr., Margaret Kini, Douglas Karpen, Pedro
J. Kowalyszyn, Sherwood C. Lynn Jr., Alan Molson, Robert L. Prince,
H. Brook Randal, Franz Theard, and William W. West, Jr. of Whole
Women’ Health in Texas. See Steven Ertelt, Tenth Texas Abortion Practitioner Under State Investigation, LIFENEWS, Aug. 24, 2011, http://www.
lifenews.com/2011/08/24/tenth-texas-abortion-practitioner-understate-investigation/ (abortion center investigated for “illegal dumping
of patient records and medical waste”).
Dr. Thomas Walter Tucker II in Alabama and Mississippi. See
Abortion Doctor Suspended for Improper Drug Storage, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
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Apr. 24, 1994, http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/1994–04–24/
news/9404240462_1_abortion-doctor-tucker-licensing (Dr. Tucker
lost his medical license for drug-storage violations, and was subsequently found liable for $10 million in a medical malpractice case involving the death of an abortion patient. See Former Abortion Doctor Ordered to Pay $10 Million, SUN HERALD, Dec. 8, 1996, 1996 WLNR
256209).
Dr. Mi Yong Kim in New York and Virginia. See Operation Rescue,
Troubled Virginia Abortion Clinic Puts Bleeding Botched Abortion Patient in
Hospital, LIFESITENEWS, Apr. 20, 2012, http://www.lifesitenews.com/
news/troubled-virginia-abortion-clinic-putsbleeding-botchedabortion-patient-in/ (patient put in hospital after abortion at clinic
run by a doctor whose license had been surrendered. The surrender
order available at http://abortiondocs.org/wp-content/uploads/
2012/04/KimVALicense-Surrender05182007. pdf.).

